# Blocklore: every published claim > The current, cited, verifiable state of Bitcoin knowledge. Compiled at block 976842 (2026-11-21T04:28:12Z). The store is CC BY 4.0: credit Blocklore and link each claim's URL (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Quotes inside sources belong to their authors and are included as citations. The code is MIT. Each claim: its statement, then status, confidence and depth, its URL, and its sources with the quote code found at each. ## Halvings and the supply schedule https://blocklore.space/topics/halvings-and-supply 6 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What it is - New bitcoin enter circulation only through the block subsidy: a fixed amount the miner of each block may pay itself, on top of the block's transaction fees. Bitcoin's rules cut the subsidy in half every 210,000 blocks, an event called a halving. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.what-it-is - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock coinbase limit, ConnectBlock, blockReward : "CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, params.GetConsensus());" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy, comment : "Subsidy is cut in half every 210,000 blocks which will occur approximately every 4 years." - Bitcoin halvings are counted in blocks, not dates: the subsidy halves every 210,000 blocks, which Bitcoin Core's source code describes as occurring approximately every four years. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.about-four-years - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy, comment : "Subsidy is cut in half every 210,000 blocks which will occur approximately every 4 years." - Bitcoin's block subsidy started at 50 BTC per block: the genesis block was created with a 50 BTC coinbase, and the rules allowed a 50 BTC subsidy for every block up to block 209,999. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.started-at-50-btc - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "CAmount nSubsidy = 50 * COIN;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet genesis block, CMainParams, genesis block : "genesis = CreateGenesisBlock(1231006505, 2083236893, 0x1d00ffff, 1, 50 * COIN);" - T1 Coinbase subsidy of blocks 1 and 209,999, Blocks 1 and 209,999 coinbase outputs minus fees ### The halvings so far - Bitcoin's first halving took effect at block 210,000, timestamped 28 November 2012, cutting the block subsidy from 50 BTC to 25 BTC per block. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.first-halving - T1 Block 210,000, Block 210,000 header time and coinbase subsidy, blocks 209,999 and 210,000 - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - Bitcoin's second halving took effect at block 420,000, timestamped 9 July 2016, cutting the block subsidy from 25 BTC to 12.5 BTC per block. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.second-halving - T1 Block 420,000, Block 420,000 header time and coinbase subsidy, blocks 419,999 and 420,000 - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - Bitcoin's third halving took effect at block 630,000, timestamped 11 May 2020, cutting the block subsidy from 12.5 BTC to 6.25 BTC per block. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.third-halving - T1 Block 630,000, Block 630,000 header time and coinbase subsidy, blocks 629,999 and 630,000 - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - Bitcoin's fourth halving took effect at block 840,000, timestamped 20 April 2024, cutting the block subsidy from 6.25 BTC to 3.125 BTC per block. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.fourth-halving - T1 Block 840,000, Block 840,000 header time and coinbase subsidy, blocks 839,999 and 840,000 - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - As of block 976,751 (20 November 2026), Bitcoin's block subsidy is 3.125 BTC (312,500,000 sats) per block, the amount set by the fourth halving at block 840,000. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.current-subsidy - T1 Coinbase subsidy of block 976,751, Blocks 840,000 and 976,751 coinbase outputs minus fees - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - Bitcoin's fifth halving is set by the 210,000-block interval to take effect at block 1,050,000, cutting the block subsidy from 3.125 BTC to 1.5625 BTC. As of block 976,751, that height is 73,249 blocks away. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.next-halving - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet halving interval, CMainParams, nSubsidyHalvingInterval : "consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 210000;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - A Bitcoin miner pays itself through the block's coinbase transaction, which may claim at most the block subsidy plus the fees of the block's transactions. Nodes reject a block whose coinbase claims more than that total. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.coinbase-limit - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock coinbase limit, ConnectBlock, blockReward and bad-cb-amount : "CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, params.GetConsensus());" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock coinbase limit, ConnectBlock, the check that rejects an overpaying coinbase : "if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward && state.IsValid()) {" ### The supply limit - Bitcoin Core's MAX_MONEY constant of 21,000,000 BTC is a sanity check on amounts, not the total money supply: its source comment says the supply in Bitcoin currently happens to be less than 21,000,000 BTC for various reasons. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.max-money-not-supply - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/amount.h, MAX_MONEY, MAX_MONEY comment : "Note that this constant is *not* the total money supply, which in Bitcoin" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/amount.h, MAX_MONEY, MAX_MONEY definition : "inline constexpr CAmount MAX_MONEY{21'000'000 * COIN};" - If every block claimed its full subsidy, Bitcoin's schedule would issue 2,099,999,997,690,000 sats (20,999,999.9769 BTC) in total, 0.0231 BTC under 21 million, because each halving shifts the subsidy in whole satoshis and drops any half satoshi. established, low confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.total-under-21-million - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy, right shift of the satoshi amount : "nSubsidy >>= halvings;" - T3 Strike, How many bitcoin are there?, Section on the supply limit : "According to the supply schedule, the actual predetermined limit is 20,999,999.9769 bitcoin" - Because Bitcoin's 50 BTC starting subsidy is 5,000,000,000 sats, shifting it right 32 times leaves 1 sat and 33 times leaves 0. The subsidy is therefore 1 sat for blocks 6,720,000 to 6,929,999 and zero from block 6,930,000 on. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.subsidy-reaches-zero - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy, right shift of the satoshi amount : "nSubsidy >>= halvings;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/amount.h, COIN, COIN : "inline constexpr CAmount COIN{100'000'000};" - The amount of bitcoin in existence is not a function of block height alone, because some allowed rewards were never claimed and some issued coins are provably unspendable. A Bitcoin Core node reports the total from its own UTXO set: the gettxoutsetinfo RPC returns total_amount, the total of all unspent outputs. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.exact-supply-needs-node - T1 Bitcoin Core src/rpc/blockchain.cpp, gettxoutsetinfo, gettxoutsetinfo, RPCResult total_amount : "The total amount of coins in the UTXO set" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/rpc/blockchain.cpp, gettxoutsetinfo, gettxoutsetinfo, RPCResult total_unspendable_amount : "The total amount of coins permanently excluded from the UTXO set (only available if coinstatsindex is used)" ### In the code - Bitcoin Core computes the block subsidy in GetBlockSubsidy (src/validation.cpp): it divides the height by nSubsidyHalvingInterval, which mainnet sets to 210,000, and shifts 50 BTC, expressed in satoshis, right by that many halvings. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.subsidy-rule - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy : "int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet halving interval, CMainParams, nSubsidyHalvingInterval : "consensus.nSubsidyHalvingInterval = 210000;" - Bitcoin's consensus rules cap a coinbase's claim at subsidy plus fees but set no minimum, so a miner can claim less. An amount left unclaimed is never paid to anyone, and Bitcoin Core's gettxoutsetinfo reports such amounts under unclaimed_rewards. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.unclaimed-rewards - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock coinbase limit, ConnectBlock, the only check on the coinbase value is an upper bound : "if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward && state.IsValid()) {" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/rpc/blockchain.cpp, gettxoutsetinfo, gettxoutsetinfo, RPCResult unspendables.unclaimed_rewards : "Fee rewards that miners did not claim in their coinbase transaction" - The 50 BTC coinbase of Bitcoin's genesis block cannot be spent: Bitcoin Core skips connecting the genesis block's transactions, so that output never enters the UTXO set, and gettxoutsetinfo lists it as unspendable. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.genesis-unspendable - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock genesis special case, ConnectBlock, special case for the genesis block : "(its coinbase is unspendable)" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/rpc/blockchain.cpp, gettxoutsetinfo, gettxoutsetinfo, RPCResult unspendables.genesis_block : "The unspendable amount of the Genesis block subsidy" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet genesis block, CMainParams, genesis block : "genesis = CreateGenesisBlock(1231006505, 2083236893, 0x1d00ffff, 1, 50 * COIN);" - Blocks 91,842 and 91,880 contain coinbase transactions identical to earlier ones, which was possible before BIP 30 because early coinbases were easy to duplicate. BIP 30 forbids such duplicates in all blocks except these two, and Bitcoin Core exempts them in IsBIP30Repeat. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.bip30-duplicate-coinbases - T1 BIP 30, Duplicate transactions, Specification : "to apply to all blocks except the two historic blocks at heights 91842 and 91880 on the main chain" - T1 BIP 30, Duplicate transactions, Motivation : "in particular coinbases are easy to duplicate" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, IsBIP30Repeat, IsBIP30Repeat : "return (block_index.nHeight==91842 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256{" - The 50 BTC coinbase outputs of blocks 91,722 and 91,812 can never be spent, because identical coinbases mined later, in blocks 91,842 and 91,880, overwrote them. Bitcoin Core marks them in IsBIP30Unspendable, and gettxoutsetinfo with coinstatsindex reports them in its bip30 total. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.bip30-overwritten-coinbases - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, IsBIP30Unspendable, IsBIP30Unspendable : "return (block_height==91722 && block_hash == uint256{" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/rpc/blockchain.cpp, gettxoutsetinfo, gettxoutsetinfo, RPCResult unspendables.bip30 : "Transactions overridden by duplicates (no longer possible with BIP30)" - T1 Coinbase subsidy of blocks 91,722 and 91,812, Blocks 91,722 and 91,812 block hashes and coinbase outputs ### Specifications and history - BIP 42 noted that Bitcoin's subsidy code shifted by the halving count, a shift undefined in C++ from 64 on, so the subsidy could repeat its cycle every 64 halvings. Bitcoin Core's GetBlockSubsidy now returns zero from 64 halvings on, keeping the supply finite. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.shift-guard-bip42 - T1 BIP 42, A finite monetary supply for Bitcoin, Details : "the cycle repeats itself every 64 halvings on all currently supported platforms." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockSubsidy, GetBlockSubsidy, guard on the shift : "Force block reward to zero when right shift is undefined." - BIP 34 requires each block's height as the first item of its coinbase scriptSig, a rule its stated motivation ties to enforcing block and transaction uniqueness. Bitcoin Core's mainnet parameters set BIP34Height to block 227,931. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.bip34-height-in-coinbase - T1 BIP 34, Block v2, Height in Coinbase, Specification : "Add height as the first item in the coinbase transaction's scriptSig, and increase block version to 2." - T1 BIP 34, Block v2, Height in Coinbase, Motivation : "Enforce block and transaction uniqueness, and assist unconnected block validation." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, BIP34Height, CMainParams, BIP34Height : "consensus.BIP34Height = 227931;" - BIP 34 does not rule out every duplicate coinbase: some early coinbases could be replayed in future blocks, so Bitcoin Core enforces BIP 30 checks again from block 1,983,702 on. BIP 54 (consensus cleanup), a proposed soft fork whose BIP status is Complete as of 20 November 2026, specifies that each coinbase's nLockTime equal the block height minus 1. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.bip54-future-duplicates - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock BIP30 enforcement, ConnectBlock, comment on BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT : "TODO: Remove BIP30 checking from block height 1,983,702 on, once we have a" - T1 BIP 54, Consensus Cleanup, Specification, coinbase transactions : "The coinbase transaction's `nLockTime` field must be set to the height of the block minus 1" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Consensus cleanup soft fork, Topic summary, duplicate transactions : "Some early coinbase transactions exhibit patterns that would allow them to be replayed in future blocks." ### Fees, subsidy and security - A 2026 Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance report found that transaction fees averaged 0.67% of Bitcoin miner revenue in the 90 days to 4 October 2026, the rest coming from the block subsidy, and that fees had rarely exceeded 5% of miner revenue since 2010. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/halvings-and-supply.fee-share-of-revenue - T2 Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance, Funding Bitcoin's Future: Paying for Security as the Block Subsidy Fades (2026), Publication page, key findings : "Fees averaged 0.67% of miner revenue in the 90 days to 4 October 2026 and have rarely exceeded 5% since 2010." ## The UTXO model https://blocklore.space/topics/utxo-model ### What it is - Bitcoin does not keep account balances. It records ownership as unspent transaction outputs (UTXOs): each output is an amount of bitcoin locked to a condition, usually a signature from a particular key, that stays spendable until a later transaction consumes it. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.what-it-is - T2 learnmeabitcoin, UTXO, Opening definition : "UTXOs are simply the transaction outputs that have not been consumed yet and can still be used for spending." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, CTxOut, doc comment above class CTxOut : "An output of a transaction. It contains the public key that the next input" - T2 Delgado-Segura et al., Analysis of the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2017/1095), Abstract : "Bitcoin relies on the Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) set to efficiently verify new generated transactions." - The Bitcoin white paper defines an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures: each owner passes the coin on by signing a hash of the previous transaction together with the public key of the next owner. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.chain-of-signatures - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 2, Transactions : "We define an electronic coin as a chain of digital signatures. Each owner transfers the coin to the next by digitally signing a hash of the previous transaction and the public key of the next owner" - A Bitcoin transaction spends coins by taking earlier unspent outputs as its inputs and creating new outputs. Nodes then remove the spent outputs from their record of unspent outputs and add the newly created ones. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.spending-consumes-outputs - T2 learnmeabitcoin, UTXO, UTXO set section : "UTXOs that get spent in a transaction are removed from the database, and the new outputs are added to the database." - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 9, Combining and Splitting Value : "To allow value to be split and combined, transactions contain multiple inputs and outputs." - A Bitcoin payment that spends outputs worth more than the amount being paid usually creates two outputs: one for the payee and one, called change, that returns the remainder to the sender, as the Bitcoin white paper describes. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.change - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 9, Combining and Splitting Value : "Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts, and at most two outputs: one for the payment, and one returning the change, if any, back to the sender." ### In your wallet - A Bitcoin balance is not a number stored on the chain. The balance of an address is the sum of the unspent outputs locked to it, and a wallet's balance is the total of the unspent outputs it can spend. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.wallet-balance - T2 learnmeabitcoin, UTXO, Address balance : "Therefore, the balance of an address is just the sum of all the UTXOs that have been locked to that address." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/rpc/coins.cpp, listunspent help text, listunspent RPC description : "Returns array of unspent transaction outputs" - One Bitcoin payment can spend several inputs at once: when no single unspent output in a wallet covers the amount, the wallet's coin selection combines several smaller outputs as inputs to the same transaction. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.multiple-inputs - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 9, Combining and Splitting Value : "Normally there will be either a single input from a larger previous transaction or multiple inputs combining smaller amounts" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Coin selection, Topic summary : "Coin selection is the method a wallet uses to choose which of its UTXOs to spend in a particular transaction." - A Bitcoin transaction's fee is not written as a separate field: it is the amount by which the total value of its inputs exceeds the total value of its outputs, and Bitcoin Core rejects a transaction whose outputs are worth more than its inputs. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.fee-is-difference - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 6, Incentive : "If the output value of a transaction is less than its input value, the difference is a transaction fee" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, value-in below value-out : "return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-in-belowout"," - Bitcoin nodes accept a block only if every transaction in it is valid and spends outputs that are still unspent. Bitcoin Core rejects a transaction whose inputs are missing or already spent, which is how the UTXO model stops the same coins being spent twice. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.double-spend-check - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 5, Network, step 5 : "Nodes accept the block only if all transactions in it are valid and not already spent." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, missing or spent inputs : "return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent"," - A Bitcoin payment's new outputs enter the shared record when a block includes the transaction. Each later block built on top counts as a further confirmation, because changing the earlier block would mean redoing the proof-of-work of every block after it. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.confirmations - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 8, Simplified Payment Verification : "and blocks added after it further confirm the network has accepted it." - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 4, Proof-of-Work : "As later blocks are chained after it, the work to change the block would include redoing all the blocks after it." ### Privacy and coin control - The Bitcoin white paper notes that multi-input transactions reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner, so spending several unspent outputs together in one transaction can let observers link payments that were otherwise separate. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.input-linking - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 10, Privacy : "Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner." - The Bitcoin white paper recommends a new key pair for each transaction, as an additional firewall that keeps transactions from being linked to a common owner. Bitcoin Optech groups such methods of limiting output linking under the name reuse avoidance. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.new-key-per-transaction - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System (white paper), Section 10, Privacy : "As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Output linking, Topic summary : "Methods for limiting the loss of privacy from output linking fall under the category of reuse avoidance." - Address reuse, which Bitcoin Optech also calls output linking, happens when a user receives two or more payments to the same public key or other unique script element; other users can then reasonably assume that the same person received all of those payments. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.address-reuse - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Output linking, Topic summary : "Output linking, also called address reuse, occurs when a user receives two or more payments to the same public key or other unique script element." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Output linking, Topic summary, second paragraph : "other users can reasonably assume that the same person received all of those payments even if the payments are later spent in separate transactions." - Bitcoin Optech notes that output linking through a reused address can happen because a user reuses the address out of ignorance, or because someone deliberately targets the user, as in a dust attack. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.dust-attack - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Output linking, Topic summary : "This may happen because the user reuses an address out of ignorance or as the result of deliberate targeting, as in a dust attack." - Bitcoin Core's wallet supports coin control: a user can lock in specific unspent outputs for a transaction, and the wallet then includes those outputs even when its own coin selection would not have chosen them. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.coin-control - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/coincontrol.h, CCoinControl::Select, CCoinControl, doc comment of Select : "The output will be included in the transaction even if it's not the most optimal choice." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Coin selection, Topic summary : "Coin selection is the method a wallet uses to choose which of its UTXOs to spend in a particular transaction." - Bitcoin Core's wallet coin control (CCoinControl) has two options about addresses: one avoids partial use of funds sent to a given address, and another forbids spending outputs received at addresses that have already been used. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.avoid-partial-spends - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/coincontrol.h, CCoinControl members, CCoinControl, m_avoid_partial_spends and m_avoid_address_reuse : "Avoid partial use of funds sent to a given address" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/coincontrol.h, CCoinControl members, CCoinControl, m_avoid_address_reuse : "Forbids inclusion of dirty (previously used) addresses" - As of block 976,753, Bitcoin Core's default relay policy calls an output dust when spending it would cost more in fees than it is worth at the default dust feerate of 3,000 sats per 1,000 vB, which puts the threshold at 546 sats for a typical non-segwit output and 294 sats for a P2WPKH output. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.dust-threshold - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/policy.cpp, GetDustThreshold, GetDustThreshold, opening comment : "If you'd pay more in fees than the value of the output" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/policy.cpp, GetDustThreshold, GetDustThreshold, opening comment, non-segwit example : "546 satoshis at the default rate of 3000 sat/kvB." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/policy.cpp, GetDustThreshold, GetDustThreshold, opening comment, P2WPKH example : "294 satoshis at the default rate of 3000 sat/kvB." ### In the code - A Bitcoin transaction input names the output it spends by an outpoint: the transaction id of the earlier transaction plus a 32-bit index into that transaction's list of outputs, represented in Bitcoin Core by the COutPoint class. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.outpoint - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, COutPoint, doc comment above class COutPoint : "An outpoint - a combination of a transaction hash and an index n into its vout" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, CTxIn, doc comment above class CTxIn : "An input of a transaction. It contains the location of the previous" - A Bitcoin transaction output, the CTxOut class in Bitcoin Core, holds two fields: an amount (nValue) and a locking script (scriptPubKey) whose conditions the input that later spends the output must satisfy. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.output-structure - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, CTxOut, class CTxOut, members nValue and scriptPubKey : "CScript scriptPubKey;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, CTxOut, doc comment above class CTxOut : "An output of a transaction. It contains the public key that the next input" - Since segregated witness (BIP 141), the data that unlocks a Bitcoin output can sit in a separate witness structure that the transaction id does not cover; Bitcoin Core stores it with each input as scriptWitness, beside the older scriptSig. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.witness - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction ID : "A new data structure, witness, is defined. Each transaction will have 2 IDs." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction ID : "Definition of txid remains unchanged: the double SHA256 of the traditional serialization format:" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/transaction.h, CTxIn, class CTxIn, members : "CScriptWitness scriptWitness;" - Outputs of a Bitcoin coinbase transaction, which pays the block reward, cannot be spent until 100 more blocks have been mined. Bitcoin Core enforces this consensus rule with COINBASE_MATURITY set to 100 blocks, checked in Consensus::CheckTxInputs. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.coinbase-maturity - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/consensus.h, COINBASE_MATURITY, COINBASE_MATURITY and its comment : "Coinbase transaction outputs can only be spent after this number of new blocks (network rule)" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, coinbase maturity check : "if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {" - Bitcoin Core represents each unspent output as a Coin, which its source code calls a UTXO entry. A Coin records the height of the block that created the output and a flag marking coinbase outputs, the data the coinbase maturity check reads. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.coin-entry - T1 Bitcoin Core src/coins.h, class Coin, doc comment above class Coin : "A UTXO entry." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/coins.h, class Coin, class Coin, fCoinBase and nHeight members : "uint32_t nHeight : 31;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, coinbase maturity check : "if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {" - Bitcoin Core reads and writes the UTXO set through layered views defined around CCoinsView in src/coins.h: CCoinsViewCache keeps an in-memory cache on top of another view, and CCoinsViewDB is backed by the coin database in the node's chainstate directory. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.ccoinsview - T1 Bitcoin Core src/coins.h, CCoinsView, doc comment above class CCoinsView : "Pure abstract view on the open txout dataset." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/coins.h, CCoinsViewCache, doc comment above class CCoinsViewCache : "CCoinsView that adds a memory cache for transactions to another CCoinsView" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/txdb.h, CCoinsViewDB, doc comment above class CCoinsViewDB : "CCoinsView backed by the coin database (chainstate/)" - Bitcoin Core keeps the full set of unspent outputs in its chainstate database, separate from the stored blocks, so a node can check that the outputs a new transaction spends exist and are unspent without rereading the block history. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.chainstate-database - T2 learnmeabitcoin, UTXO, UTXO set section : "In Bitcoin Core, all of the UTXOs are stored in the chainstate database:" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/txdb.h, CCoinsViewDB, doc comment above class CCoinsViewDB : "CCoinsView backed by the coin database (chainstate/)" - T2 Delgado-Segura et al., Analysis of the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2017/1095), Abstract : "Bitcoin relies on the Unspent Transaction Outputs (UTXO) set to efficiently verify new generated transactions." ### Duplicate transactions - BIP 30 forbids a Bitcoin block from containing a transaction whose txid matches an earlier transaction in the same chain that still has unspent outputs, closing a flaw in which a duplicate transaction could overwrite the earlier one's unspent outputs. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.bip30 - T1 BIP 30, Duplicate transactions, Specification : "Blocks are not allowed to contain a transaction whose identifier matches that of an earlier, not-fully-spent transaction in the same chain." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock, Chainstate::ConnectBlock, BIP30 check : "Do not allow blocks that contain transactions which 'overwrite' older transactions," - BIP 34 requires each Bitcoin block to put its height as the first item of its coinbase transaction's scriptSig, to enforce block and transaction uniqueness; Bitcoin Core records the mainnet activation height of this rule as block 227,931. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.bip34 - T1 BIP 34, Block v2, Height in Coinbase, Specification : "Add height as the first item in the coinbase transaction's scriptSig, and increase block version to 2." - T1 BIP 34, Block v2, Height in Coinbase, Motivation : "Enforce block and transaction uniqueness, and assist unconnected block validation." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, BIP34Height and BIP34Hash : "consensus.BIP34Height = 227931;" - Bitcoin Core treats exactly two mainnet blocks, 91,842 and 91,880, as exceptions to the BIP 30 duplicate-transaction rule, identifying each by both height and block hash in the function IsBIP30Repeat in src/validation.cpp. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.bip30-exceptions - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, IsBIP30Repeat, IsBIP30Repeat : "return (block_index.nHeight==91842 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256{" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock, Chainstate::ConnectBlock, fEnforceBIP30 : "bool fEnforceBIP30 = !IsBIP30Repeat(*pindex);" - Besides the two BIP 30 exemptions, Bitcoin Core's src/validation.cpp names two earlier mainnet blocks, 91,722 and 91,812, by both height and block hash in a separate function, IsBIP30Unspendable. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.bip30-unspendable - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, IsBIP30Unspendable, IsBIP30Unspendable : "return (block_height==91722 && block_hash == uint256{" - Bitcoin Core relies on BIP 34 to skip BIP 30 duplicate-transaction lookups only below block 1,983,702, its constant BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT; from that height on it enforces the BIP 30 check again, because some coinbase transactions from before BIP 34 could otherwise be repeated. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.bip34-limit - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ConnectBlock, Chainstate::ConnectBlock, BIP30 enforcement condition : "if (fEnforceBIP30 || pindex->nHeight >= BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT) {" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT comment, Chainstate::ConnectBlock, comment above BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT : "greater than 1,983,702, so we simply remove the optimization to skip" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Consensus cleanup soft fork, Duplicate transaction vector : "Some early coinbase transactions exhibit patterns that would allow them to be replayed in future blocks." - The consensus cleanup soft fork proposal, as summarized by Bitcoin Optech, includes a rule that would make future coinbase transactions unique without needing BIP 30 checks for those blocks, which would close the duplicate-transaction gap left by early coinbases. speculative, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.consensus-cleanup-coinbase - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Consensus cleanup soft fork, Duplicate transaction vector : "enforces that future coinbase transactions are unique without needing to enforce BIP30 checks for those blocks." ### Size of the UTXO set - A 2017 academic analysis of the Bitcoin UTXO set states that every unspent output, whatever its type, age, value or length, is stored in every full node, and measures how much of the set is dust and unprofitable outputs. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.storage-burden - T2 Delgado-Segura et al., Analysis of the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2017/1095), Abstract : "no matter its type, age, value or length is stored in every full node." - T2 Delgado-Segura et al., Analysis of the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2017/1095), Abstract : "analysis of the volume of dust and unprofitable outputs included in the set," - The Bitcoin UTXO set held 176,948,713 unspent outputs at block 840,000 and 184,821,030 at block 880,000, according to snapshot dumps posted by reviewers of Bitcoin Core's mainnet assumeutxo parameters: growth of about 7.9 million outputs over 40,000 blocks. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.utxo-set-growth - T1 Bitcoin Core PR, Approving review, dumptxoutset output for height 840,000 : ""coins_written": 176948713," - T1 Bitcoin Core PR, Approving review, dumptxoutset output for height 880,000 : ""coins_written": 184821030," - Assumeutxo is a way to bootstrap a Bitcoin full node from a snapshot of the UTXO set, postponing verification of old block history: the node uses the snapshot right away and downloads and verifies the older blocks in the background. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.assumeutxo - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, AssumeUTXO, Topic summary : "is a proposed mode for bootstrapping new full nodes that allows them to postpone verifying old block chain history" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, AssumeUTXO, Topic summary : "the node would also download and verify older blocks in the background so that it could eventually prove" - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/design/assumeutxo.md, Snapshot chainstate hits network tip : "which is responsible for doing full validation of the assumed-valid parts of the chain." - Since Bitcoin Core 28.0, the loadtxoutset RPC can be used on mainnet, because that release added assumeutxo parameters for a UTXO set snapshot taken at block 840,000. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.assumeutxo-mainnet - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, Updated RPCs : "AssumeUTXO mainnet parameters have been added for height 840,000." - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, Updated RPCs : "This means the `loadtxoutset` RPC can now be used on mainnet with the matching UTXO set from that height." - As of block 976,753, Bitcoin Core's master branch hardcodes assumeutxo snapshot hashes for five mainnet heights (840,000, 880,000, 910,000, 935,000 and 965,000) in m_assumeutxo_data, and a node checks that a loaded snapshot matches the compiled value once background validation reaches it. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.assumeutxo-heights - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams m_assumeutxo_data, CMainParams, m_assumeutxo_data, last entry : ".height = 965'000," - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/design/assumeutxo.md, Background chainstate hits snapshot base block : "ensure it matches the compiled value in `CMainParams::m_assumeutxo_data`." - Utreexo is a proposed alternative to storing the full UTXO set: a node keeps a hash-based accumulator whose size grows logarithmically with the set, and transactions carry inclusion proofs showing that the outputs they spend are in it. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.utreexo - T2 Utreexo: A dynamic hash-based accumulator optimized for the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2019/611), Abstract : "We introduce a hash based accumulator to locally represent the UTXO set, which is logarithmic in the size of the full set." - T2 Utreexo: A dynamic hash-based accumulator optimized for the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2019/611), Abstract : "Nodes attach and propagate inclusion proofs to the inputs of transactions" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Utreexo, Topic summary : "Utreexo is a proposed alternative to the UTXO set for allowing full nodes to obtain and verify information" - The 2019 Utreexo paper reports that, in simulations of downloading the Bitcoin block chain up to early 2019 with 500 MB of RAM for caching, the inclusion proofs added about 25% to the data otherwise downloaded. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.utreexo-proof-overhead - T2 Utreexo: A dynamic hash-based accumulator optimized for the Bitcoin UTXO set (IACR ePrint 2019/611), Abstract : "In our simulations of downloading Bitcoin's blockchain up to early 2019 with 500MB of RAM allocated for caching, the proofs only add approximately 25% to the amount otherwise downloaded." - As of 20 November 2026, the three Utreexo specifications proposed as BIPs 181, 182 and 183 sit in bitcoin/bips pull request #1923, opened in August 2025 and marked as a draft, describing Utreexo as a consensus-compatible way to verify transactions that needs no soft fork. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/utxo-model.utreexo-bips - T1 bitcoin/bips PR #1923, BIP 181, 182, 183: BIPs for Utreexo, PR description : "These are the 3 BIPs that describe Utreexo, a consensus-compatible (non-soft fork) way to send and verify transactions" - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 8 August 2025, Draft BIPs proposed for Utreexo, News, Draft BIPs proposed for Utreexo : "The first BIP specifies the structure of the Utreexo accumulator, which allows a node to store" ## Proof of work and difficulty https://blocklore.space/topics/proof-of-work 5 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What it is - Bitcoin mining is a guessing search: miners repeatedly change a number in a candidate block and hash it with SHA-256 until the result is at or below a target, and only a block that meets the target can extend the chain. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.what-mining-is - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 4, Proof-of-Work, first paragraph : "The proof-of-work involves scanning for a value that when hashed, such as with SHA-256, the hash begins with a number of zero bits." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/block.h, CBlockHeader class comment, CBlockHeader class comment : "and scan through nonce values to make the block's hash satisfy proof-of-work" - Bitcoin mining costs real resources: the Bitcoin whitepaper compares issuing new coins through mining to gold miners spending resources, and names computer time and electricity as what Bitcoin miners spend. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.energy-cost - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 6, Incentive, first paragraph : "In our case, it is CPU time and electricity that is expended." - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 6, Incentive, first paragraph : "is analogous to gold miners expending resources to add gold to circulation." - Bitcoin aims for one block about every 10 minutes on average: the network adjusts how hard mining is so that, as more or less computing power joins, blocks keep arriving at roughly that rate. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.ten-minute-target - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet consensus parameters, CMainParams, consensus.nPowTargetSpacing : "consensus.nPowTargetSpacing = 10 * 60;" - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 4, Proof-of-Work, last paragraph : "the proof-of-work difficulty is determined by a moving average targeting an average number of blocks per hour." ### Why block times vary - A 2018 statistical study of Bitcoin block arrival data (arXiv:1801.07447) reported that block arrivals do not follow the homogeneous Poisson process it says the original Bitcoin paper suggested, and proposed a refined model covering both periods of constant difficulty and how difficulty changes over time. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.block-times-vary - T2 Block arrivals in the Bitcoin blockchain (arXiv:1801.07447), Abstract : "Based on blockchain block arrival data and stochastic analysis of the block arrival process, we demonstrate that this is not the case." - T2 Block arrivals in the Bitcoin blockchain (arXiv:1801.07447), Abstract : "In the original Bitcoin paper, it was suggested that the blockchain arrivals occur according to a homogeneous Poisson process." - T2 Block arrivals in the Bitcoin blockchain (arXiv:1801.07447), Abstract : "We present a refined mathematical model for block arrivals, focusing on both the block arrivals during a period of constant difficulty and how the difficulty level evolves over time." - Bitcoin's mainnet difficulty can change only at every 2,016th block, so when total mining power rises or falls between adjustments, blocks arrive faster or slower than 10 minutes on average until the next adjustment. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.difficulty-fixed-within-period - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, GetNextWorkRequired, GetNextWorkRequired : "// Only change once per difficulty adjustment interval" ### Work decides the chain - Bitcoin nodes follow the valid chain with the most accumulated proof of work, not the chain with the most blocks: Bitcoin Core ranks candidate chain tips first by total chain work, so a shorter chain of harder blocks can outrank a longer chain of easier ones. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.most-work-chain - T1 Bitcoin Core src/node/blockstorage.cpp, CBlockIndexWorkComparator, CBlockIndexWorkComparator::operator() : "if (pa->nChainWork > pb->nChainWork) return false;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/chain.h, CBlockIndex::nChainWork, CBlockIndex, nChainWork member comment : "Total amount of work (expected number of hashes) in the chain up to and including this block" - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 4, Proof-of-Work, third paragraph : "The majority decision is represented by the longest chain, which has the greatest proof-of-work effort invested in it." - Each block mined on top of a Bitcoin transaction adds work that anyone trying to reverse it must redo: the Bitcoin whitepaper says an attacker would have to redo the proof of work of that block and every later block, then overtake the honest chain. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.attacker-must-redo-work - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 4, Proof-of-Work, third paragraph : "To modify a past block, an attacker would have to redo the proof-of-work of the block and all blocks after it and then catch up with and surpass the work of the honest nodes." - Bitcoin Core's mainnet parameters set nMinimumChainWork, a minimum total chain work documented in the code with the comment that the best chain should have at least this much work; at commit f498a5a6 its mainnet value is 0x145ec036acc5ba740052af1a0. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.minimum-chain-work - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/params.h, nMinimumChainWork, Consensus::Params, nMinimumChainWork comment : "/** The best chain should have at least this much work */" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet nMinimumChainWork, CMainParams, consensus.nMinimumChainWork : "consensus.nMinimumChainWork = uint256{"000000000000000000000000000000000000000145ec036acc5ba740052af1a0"};" ### The header, the hash and the target - A Bitcoin block header is 80 bytes: Bitcoin Core serializes six fields, nVersion (4 bytes), hashPrevBlock (32 bytes), hashMerkleRoot (32 bytes), nTime (4 bytes), nBits (4 bytes) and nNonce (4 bytes), and proof of work is computed over these 80 bytes only. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.header-80-bytes - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/block.h, CBlockHeader serialization, CBlockHeader, SERIALIZE_METHODS : "READWRITE(obj.nVersion, obj.hashPrevBlock, obj.hashMerkleRoot, obj.nTime, obj.nBits, obj.nNonce);" - T2 Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, Section 7, Reclaiming Disk Space, last paragraph : "A block header with no transactions would be about 80 bytes." - A Bitcoin block's hash is the double SHA-256 (SHA-256 applied twice) of its serialized header: Bitcoin Core's CBlockHeader::GetHash writes the header into a HashWriter, whose GetHash computes double SHA-256. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.double-sha256 - T1 Bitcoin Core src/primitives/block.cpp, CBlockHeader::GetHash, CBlockHeader::GetHash : "return (HashWriter{} << *this).GetHash();" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/hash.h, HashWriter::GetHash, HashWriter::GetHash comment : "Compute the double-SHA256 hash of all data written to this object." - A Bitcoin header's 4-byte nBits field encodes the 256-bit target in a compact floating-point-like form: the top byte is an exponent in base 256 and the lower 23 bits are the mantissa, so the target equals mantissa times 256 to the power of (exponent minus 3). established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.nbits-compact - T1 Bitcoin Core src/arith_uint256.h, SetCompact comment, Comment above arith_uint256::SetCompact : "The most significant 8 bits are the unsigned exponent of base 256." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/arith_uint256.h, SetCompact comment, Comment above arith_uint256::SetCompact : "N = (-1^sign) * mantissa * 256^(exponent-3)" - Bitcoin Core's proof-of-work check in src/pow.cpp rejects a block header if the target decoded from its nBits is zero, negative, overflowing or above the network's proof-of-work limit, or if the header hash, read as a 256-bit number, is greater than that target. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.hash-below-target - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CheckProofOfWorkImpl, CheckProofOfWorkImpl : "if (UintToArith256(hash) > bnTarget)" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, DeriveTarget, DeriveTarget, range check : "if (fNegative || bnTarget == 0 || fOverflow || bnTarget > UintToArith256(pow_limit))" - Bitcoin's genesis block (block 0, timestamp 1231006505, 3 January 2009) has nBits 0x1d00ffff, the compact form of mainnet's easiest permitted target, which corresponds to difficulty 1. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.genesis-bits - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet genesis block, CMainParams, CreateGenesisBlock call : "genesis = CreateGenesisBlock(1231006505, 2083236893, 0x1d00ffff, 1, 50 * COIN);" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet powLimit, CMainParams, consensus.powLimit : "consensus.powLimit = uint256{"00000000ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"};" - T1 Block 0 on mempool.space, Block 0 header, bits and difficulty ### Difficulty adjustment - Bitcoin mainnet recalculates its proof-of-work target every 2,016 blocks: Bitcoin Core derives this interval as the target timespan of two weeks (1,209,600 seconds) divided by the target block spacing of 600 seconds. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.retarget-interval - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/params.h, DifficultyAdjustmentInterval, Consensus::Params::DifficultyAdjustmentInterval : "int64_t DifficultyAdjustmentInterval() const { return nPowTargetTimespan / nPowTargetSpacing; }" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet nPowTargetTimespan, CMainParams, consensus.nPowTargetTimespan : "consensus.nPowTargetTimespan = 14 * 24 * 60 * 60; // two weeks" - T2 Block arrivals in the Bitcoin blockchain (arXiv:1801.07447), Abstract : "The difficulty of the computational problem is updated every 2,016 blocks in order to control the rate at which blocks are generated." - At each mainnet retarget, Bitcoin Core's CalculateNextWorkRequired multiplies the previous target by the period's measured timespan, first limited to between one quarter and four times two weeks, divides by the two-week target timespan, and caps the result at the proof-of-work limit, so faster periods make the target smaller and mining harder. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.retarget-formula - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CalculateNextWorkRequired, CalculateNextWorkRequired, Retarget : "bnNew *= nActualTimespan;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CalculateNextWorkRequired, CalculateNextWorkRequired, division and cap : "bnNew /= params.nPowTargetTimespan;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CalculateNextWorkRequired, CalculateNextWorkRequired, Limit adjustment step : "if (nActualTimespan < params.nPowTargetTimespan/4)" - Bitcoin limits each difficulty adjustment to a factor of four: Bitcoin Core clamps the measured timespan of a 2,016-block period to between one quarter and four times the two-week target before retargeting, so one retarget can at most quadruple or quarter the target. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.clamp-factor-four - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CalculateNextWorkRequired, CalculateNextWorkRequired, Limit adjustment step : "if (nActualTimespan < params.nPowTargetTimespan/4)" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, CalculateNextWorkRequired, CalculateNextWorkRequired, Limit adjustment step : "nActualTimespan = params.nPowTargetTimespan*4;" - Bitcoin nodes do not let miners pick their own difficulty: Bitcoin Core's ContextualCheckBlockHeader rejects a header as "bad-diffbits" unless its nBits equals the value GetNextWorkRequired computes from the preceding chain. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.bad-diffbits - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, proof-of-work check : "if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams))" - At the retarget at block 32,256, mined on 30 December 2009, Bitcoin's nBits changed from 0x1d00ffff (block 32,255) to 0x1d00d86a, raising mining difficulty from 1 to about 1.18. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.block-32256-retarget - T1 Block 32,256 on mempool.space, Block 32,256 header, bits 486594666 (0x1d00d86a), timestamp 1262153464, difficulty 1.1828995343128408 - T1 Block 32,255 on mempool.space, Block 32,255 header, bits 486604799 (0x1d00ffff), difficulty 1.0 ### Timestamps and chainwork - Bitcoin Core rejects a block whose timestamp is not later than the median time past, which is the median of the timestamps of the previous 11 blocks, ending with the new block's parent. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.median-time-past - T1 Bitcoin Core src/chain.h, CBlockIndex::GetMedianTimePast, nMedianTimeSpan and GetMedianTimePast : "static constexpr int nMedianTimeSpan = 11;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, time-too-old check : "if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())" - Bitcoin Core counts each block's work as 2 to the power 256 divided by (target plus 1), the expected number of hashes needed to meet that target, and sums these values along a chain into nChainWork, the chainwork figure that decides which chain is best. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.chainwork-per-block - T1 Bitcoin Core src/chain.cpp, GetBitsProof, GetBitsProof comment : "// We need to compute 2**256 / (bnTarget+1), but we can't represent 2**256" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/chain.h, CBlockIndex::nChainWork, CBlockIndex, nChainWork member comment : "Total amount of work (expected number of hashes) in the chain up to and including this block" ### The timewarp bug and its fixes - Bitcoin Core measures each 2,016-block difficulty period from the timestamp of its own first block to that of its last block, which spans 2,015 block intervals rather than 2,016, so consecutive measurement windows do not overlap. This off-by-one is the property the timewarp attack exploits. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.retarget-window-off-by-one - T1 Bitcoin Core src/pow.cpp, GetNextWorkRequired, GetNextWorkRequired, choice of first block : "int nHeightFirst = pindexLast->nHeight - (params.DifficultyAdjustmentInterval()-1);" - T1 Great Consensus Cleanup Revival (Delving Bitcoin, post 1), Post 1, timewarp section : "The timewarp vulnerability exploits how difficulty adjustment periods don't overlap." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 24 April 2024, Selected Q&A from Bitcoin Stack Exchange, Where exactly is the off-by-one difficulty bug? : "explains the off-by-one error in Bitcoin’s difficulty retargeting calculation" - BIP 54 (Consensus Cleanup) states that the timewarp bug lets an attacker with a majority of Bitcoin's hashrate arbitrarily lower mining difficulty by manipulating block timestamps, and that in the worst case the attacker can bring difficulty to its minimum within 38 days. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.timewarp-attack - T1 BIP 54, Consensus Cleanup, Motivation : "makes it possible for a majority-hashrate attacker to arbitrarily lower mining difficulty" - T1 BIP 54, Consensus Cleanup, Motivation : "In the worst case, an attacker can bring down the difficulty to its minimum within 38 days of starting the attack." - T1 Great Consensus Cleanup Revival (Delving Bitcoin, post 1), Post 1, timewarp section : "setting the timestamp of the last block in a retarget period as much in the future as possible (now + 2h)" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Time warp, Topic summary, first paragraph : "Time warp is an exploit of Bitcoin’s difficulty adjustment algorithm that allows miners controlling a large amount" - BIP 54 proposes that the first block of each 2,016-block difficulty period (height divisible by 2,016) must have a timestamp no earlier than 7,200 seconds (two hours) before the timestamp of the block immediately preceding it, which the BIP gives as its fix for the timewarp attack. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.bip54-timewarp-rule - T1 BIP 54, Consensus Cleanup, Rationale : "The former is fixed by preventing the timestamp of the first block of a difficulty period from being lower than the previous block's, with a two-hour grace period." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Consensus cleanup soft fork, Topic summary, time warp : "permits a majority hashrate attacker to arbitrarily increase block cadence." - As of 20 November 2026, Bitcoin Core PR #35793, "Implement BIP 54 (Consensus Cleanup) without mainnet activation", is open and not merged; its description says the BIP 54 validation rules it implements are only enabled on regtest, with mainnet activation, if any, to be considered separately. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.bip54-core-implementation-pr - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #35793, Implement BIP 54 (Consensus Cleanup) without mainnet activation, PR description and state (open) : "This implements the Consensus Cleanup validation rules proposed in BIP 54" - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #35793, Implement BIP 54 (Consensus Cleanup) without mainnet activation, PR description, first paragraph : "These rules are only enabled on regtest. Mainnet activation, if any, is to be considered separately." - BIP 94 (Testnet 4) adds a timewarp rule: the first block of each difficulty period must not be timestamped more than 600 seconds before the previous block. Bitcoin Core enforces this rule only on testnet4 and regtest; its mainnet parameters set enforce_BIP94 to false. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.bip94-testnet4 - T1 BIP 94, Testnet 4, Specification, consensus rules, rule 1 : "of the immediately prior block minus 600 seconds" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/consensus.h, MAX_TIMEWARP, MAX_TIMEWARP : "inline constexpr int64_t MAX_TIMEWARP = 600;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, ContextualCheckBlockHeader, BIP94 timewarp check : "// Testnet4 and regtest only: Check timestamp against prev for difficulty-adjustment" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, mainnet enforce_BIP94, CMainParams, consensus.enforce_BIP94 : "consensus.enforce_BIP94 = false;" - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #29775, Testnet4 including PoW difficulty adjustment fix, PR description : "a fix to the difficulty adjustment mechanism, which was part of the motivation that started the discussion." - At commit f498a5a6, Bitcoin Core's GetMinimumTime raises the minimum block template timestamp on all networks to respect both the BIP 94 600-second timewarp limit and the BIP 54 rule that a period's last block is not earlier than its first; the BIP 54 part came from Bitcoin Core PR #35949, merged 7 September 2026. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/proof-of-work.miner-template-rules - T1 Bitcoin Core src/node/miner.cpp, GetMinimumTime, GetMinimumTime : "min_time = std::max(min_time, pindexPrev->GetBlockTime() - MAX_TIMEWARP);" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/node/miner.cpp, GetMinimumTime, GetMinimumTime, BIP54 Murch-Zawy rule : "min_time = std::max(min_time, first_block->GetBlockTime());" - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #35949, miner: Enforce Murch-Zawy rule (BIP54), PR description : "This makes the miner enforce the murch-zawy rule for which #35793 adds the validation part." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 11 September 2026, Notable code and documentation changes, Bitcoin Core : "updates block template creation to follow BIP54’s proposed mitigation for the" ## The fee market and mempool policy https://blocklore.space/topics/fees-and-mempool 12 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What it is - Bitcoin blocks have limited space: a consensus rule caps each block at 4,000,000 weight units. Because more transactions can be waiting than fit in the next block, users attach fees to compete for inclusion, and transactions paying higher fee rates are generally mined first. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.limited-block-space - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/consensus.h, MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT, MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT : "inline constexpr unsigned int MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT{4'000'000};" - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Block size : "The new rule is block weight ≤ 4,000,000." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.h, CBlockPolicyEstimator comment, Doc comment above class CBlockPolicyEstimator : "the assumption that in general transactions of higher feerate will be" - A Bitcoin transaction's fee is not a separate field: it is the total value of the transaction's inputs minus the total value of its outputs. Bitcoin Core's consensus code computes the fee this way and rejects as invalid a transaction that spends inputs worth less than its outputs. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.fee-definition - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, fee computation : "const CAmount txfee_aux = nValueIn - value_out;" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, Consensus::CheckTxInputs, inputs below outputs check : "if (nValueIn < value_out) {" - A mempool (short for memory pool) is the set of valid but unconfirmed transactions that a Bitcoin node holds while they wait to be mined. Each node keeps its own mempool under its own local rules, so there is no single network-wide mempool. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.mempool-definition - T2 Bitcoin Developer Guide, P2P Network, Memory Pool, Memory Pool : "Bitcoin Core stores them in non-persistent memory, calling them a memory pool or mempool." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/txmempool.h, CTxMemPool doc comment, Doc comment above class CTxMemPool : "CTxMemPool stores valid-according-to-the-current-best-chain transactions" - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/README.md, Opening paragraph : "These rules are local to the node and configurable, see "Node relay options" when running `-help`." ### Fee rates and waiting - Bitcoin fee rates are usually quoted in satoshis per virtual byte (sat/vB). BIP 141 defines a transaction's virtual size as its weight divided by 4, rounded up, so the same fee rate costs a larger transaction more sats in total. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.fee-rate-units - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction size calculations : "Virtual transaction size is defined as Transaction weight / 4 (rounded up to the next integer)." - T1 Bitcoin Core 30.0 release notes, Policy, minimum relay feerate (#33106) : "(`-incrementalrelayfee`) have been changed to 0.1 satoshis per vB." - A Bitcoin transaction can stay unconfirmed for a long time when its fee rate is low compared with other transactions waiting to be mined, because transactions paying higher fee rates are generally mined first. Since Bitcoin Core 31.0, its block templates select mempool transactions in order of the fee rate at which they are expected to be mined. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.stuck-transaction - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, cluster mempool ordering : "Within the mempool, transactions are ordered based on the feerate at which" - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, cluster mempool ordering : "by the algorithms that implement transaction selection for constructing block" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.h, CBlockPolicyEstimator comment, Doc comment above class CBlockPolicyEstimator : "the assumption that in general transactions of higher feerate will be" - Bitcoin Core limits its mempool to 300 MB of memory by default (the -maxmempool option). When the mempool is full, a node starts rejecting new transactions below a minimum fee rate threshold and evicts low fee rate transactions, so a low-fee transaction can drop out of some nodes' mempools. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.mempool-full-eviction - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/mempool_options.h, DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE_MB : "/** Default for -maxmempool, maximum megabytes of mempool memory usage */" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/txmempool.h, TrimToSize, Doc comment above CTxMemPool::TrimToSize : "Remove transactions from the mempool until its dynamic size is <= sizelimit." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/txmempool.h, GetMinFee, Doc comment above CTxMemPool::GetMinFee : "The minimum fee to get into the mempool, which may itself not be enough" - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, cluster mempool ordering : "eviction from the mempool when it is full" - Bitcoin Core removes a transaction from its mempool if it is still unconfirmed 336 hours (14 days) after entering, by default. The limit is set by the -mempoolexpiry option, so other nodes may keep or drop the same transaction at different times. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.mempool-expiry - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/mempool_options.h, DEFAULT_MEMPOOL_EXPIRY_HOURS : "/** Default for -mempoolexpiry, expiration time for mempool transactions in hours */" ### Speeding up a transaction - Replace-by-fee (RBF) is a node relay policy that lets an unconfirmed Bitcoin transaction be replaced by a different transaction spending at least one of the same inputs and paying a higher fee. A sender can use RBF to speed up a stuck transaction. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.rbf-definition - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Replace-by-fee (RBF), Topic summary : "Replace-By-Fee (RBF) is a node policy that allows an unconfirmed transaction in a mempool to be replaced" - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md, Opening paragraph : "A transaction conflicts with an in-mempool transaction ("directly conflicting transaction") if they" - Child pays for parent (CPFP) is a way to speed up a stuck, low fee rate Bitcoin transaction: someone who controls one of its outputs spends that output in a new child transaction with a high fee rate, which encourages miners to include both transactions in a block. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.cpfp-definition - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Child pays for parent (CPFP), Topic summary : "Child Pays For Parent (CPFP) is a fee bumping technique where a user spends an output from a low-feerate unconfirmed" - Bitcoin Core's wallet has a bumpfee command that replaces an unconfirmed wallet transaction with a new version paying a higher fee, taking the extra fee from change outputs or by adding inputs when necessary. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.bumpfee-rpc - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/rpc/spend.cpp, bumpfee help text, bumpfee_helper, RPC description : "Bumps the fee of a transaction T, replacing it with a new transaction B." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/rpc/spend.cpp, bumpfee help text, bumpfee_helper, RPC description : "The command will pay the additional fee by reducing change outputs or adding inputs when necessary." ### Consensus and relay policy - Bitcoin Core's relay policy is a set of rules a node applies, in addition to consensus rules, to unconfirmed transactions before accepting them into its mempool. Policy is local to each node and configurable, and it is not applied to transactions in blocks, so a block can contain transactions a node would not have relayed. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.consensus-versus-policy - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/README.md, Opening paragraph : "Policy (Mempool or Transaction Relay Policy) is the node's set of validation rules, in addition to consensus," - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/README.md, Opening paragraph : "Policy is *not* applied to transactions in blocks." - Because relay policy differs from node to node, a transaction one node accepts may not reach miners. The Bitcoin Core 30.0 release notes warn that transactions created with the newly allowed lower fee rates are not guaranteed to propagate or confirm unless the lower defaults are widely adopted across the network. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.policy-propagation-caveat - T1 Bitcoin Core 30.0 release notes, Policy (#33106) : "Note that unless these lower defaults are widely adopted across the network, transactions" - Since Bitcoin Core 30.0, published on 10 October 2025, the default minimum relay fee rate (-minrelaytxfee) and incremental relay fee rate (-incrementalrelayfee) are both 0.1 sat/vB, set in the code as 100 satoshis per 1,000 vB. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.min-relay-fee - T1 Bitcoin Core 30.0 release notes, Policy (#33106) : "The default minimum relay feerate (`-minrelaytxfee`) and incremental relay feerate" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/policy.h, DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE, DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE : "inline constexpr unsigned int DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE{100};" - T1 Bitcoin Core 30.0 release announcement, Release page header : "Bitcoin Core 30.0 was published on October 10, 2025." - CBlockPolicyEstimator, a fee estimator in Bitcoin Core's src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.h, estimates the fee rate a transaction needs to be confirmed within a target number of blocks by grouping observed transactions into buckets of similar fee rates and tracking how quickly each bucket confirms. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.fee-estimator - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.h, Doc comment above class CBlockPolicyEstimator : "The BlockPolicyEstimator is used for estimating the feerate needed" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/fees/block_policy_estimator.h, Doc comment above class CBlockPolicyEstimator : "At a high level the algorithm works by grouping transactions into buckets" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Fee estimation, Topic summary : "Fee estimation is the process of estimating the feerate a transaction will need to pay to have a high probability" ### Replacement rules - BIP 125 specifies opt-in replace-by-fee: a transaction signals that it may be replaced if any of its inputs has an nSequence value below 0xfffffffe, and BIP 125 caps the transactions a replacement may evict, counting their descendants, at 100. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.bip125-signaling - T1 BIP 125, Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling, Summary, signaling : "if any of its inputs have an nSequence number less than (0xffffffff - 1)." - T1 BIP 125, Opt-in Full Replace-by-Fee Signaling, Implementation details, rule 5 : "which will be evicted from the mempool must not exceed a total of 100 transactions." - Bitcoin Core 28.0, published on 2 October 2024, changed the default of the -mempoolfullrbf option from 0 to 1 (Bitcoin Core PR #30493), so nodes running defaults accept replacements of unconfirmed transactions whether or not they signal BIP 125 replaceability. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.full-rbf-default - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, Mempool policy changes (#30493) : "The default value of the `-mempoolfullrbf` configuration option has been changed from 0 to 1," - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release announcement, Release page header : "Bitcoin Core 28.0 was published on October 02, 2024." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Replace-by-fee (RBF), Topic summary, full-RBF : "whether or not it signals BIP125 replaceability." - Bitcoin Core 29.0 removed the -mempoolfullrbf option (Bitcoin Core PR #30592), making full replace-by-fee the standard behavior. Since then, Bitcoin Core's replacement rules no longer require a transaction to signal BIP 125 replaceability before it can be replaced. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.full-rbf-option-removed - T1 Bitcoin Core 29.0 release notes, Mempool policy changes (#30592) : "users no longer benefit from disabling it, so the option has been removed, making full replace-by-fee the standard behavior." - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md, History : "Signaling for replace-by-fee is no longer required as of" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Replace-by-fee (RBF), Optech newsletter mentions : "Bitcoin Core #30592 removes the mempoolfullrbf setting" - Under Bitcoin Core's replacement rules, a replacement transaction must pay at least the total absolute fee of the transactions it replaces, plus enough extra to pay for its own size at the incremental relay fee rate: at 0.1 sat/vB, a 500 vB replacement must add at least 50 sats. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.rbf-pays-more - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md, Rule 3 : "The replacement transaction pays an absolute fee of at least the sum paid by the original transactions." - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md, Rule 4 : "replacement pays a fee at least 50 satoshis higher than the sum of the original transactions." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/rbf.h, PaysForRBF, PaysForRBF declaration : "std::optional PaysForRBF(CAmount original_fees," ### TRUC, packages and clusters - BIP 431 defines TRUC (Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation) transactions: a transaction with version 3 opts into rules that, while it is unconfirmed, allow at most one unconfirmed parent or child, cap its size at 10,000 vB, and cap a TRUC child of an unconfirmed TRUC parent at 1,000 vB. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.truc-rules - T1 BIP 431, Topology Restrictions for Pinning, Specification, rule 3 : "An unconfirmed TRUC transaction cannot have more than 1 unconfirmed descendant." - T1 BIP 431, Topology Restrictions for Pinning, Specification, rule 4 : "A TRUC transaction cannot have a sigop-adjusted virtual size larger than 10,000 vB." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/truc_policy.h, TRUC_CHILD_MAX_VSIZE : "inline constexpr int64_t TRUC_CHILD_MAX_VSIZE{1000};" - Since Bitcoin Core 28.0, version 3 transactions are standard on all networks, subject to the opt-in TRUC (Topologically Restricted Until Confirmation) policy of BIP 431 (Bitcoin Core PR #29496). established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.truc-standard-since-28 - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, Mempool policy changes, TRUC (#29496) : "Transactions with version number set to 3 are now treated as standard on all networks (#29496)," - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/truc_policy.h, TRUC_VERSION : "inline constexpr decltype(CTransaction::version) TRUC_VERSION{3};" - Since Bitcoin Core 28.0, a node that receives a transaction paying too low a fee rate for its mempool can pair it with a child transaction and evaluate both as a package (1-parent-1-child package relay), so a child can pay for a parent that would otherwise be rejected. The release notes call this feature limited and not yet reliable under adversarial conditions. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.package-relay-1p1c - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, P2P and network changes, package relay (#28970) : "Transactions having a feerate that is too low will be opportunistically paired with" - T1 Bitcoin Core 28.0 release notes, P2P and network changes, package relay (#28970), warning : "Warning: this P2P feature is limited (unlike the `submitpackage` interface, a child with multiple unconfirmed parents is not supported) and not yet reliable under adversarial conditions." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Package relay, Topic summary : "Package relay is a proposed feature for Bitcoin relay nodes that would allow them to send and receive packages" - T1 Bitcoin Core 30.0 release notes, P2P, 1p1c improvement (#31385) : "Opportunistic 1-parent-1-child package relay has been improved to handle" - Bitcoin Core 31.0, published on 19 April 2026, reimplemented the mempool as a "cluster mempool": it groups connected unconfirmed transactions into clusters, by default at most 64 transactions and 101 kvB each, and drops the earlier ancestor and descendant limits. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.cluster-mempool - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, cluster limits : "limiting clusters to 64 transactions and up to 101 kB in virtual size." - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, ancestor and descendant limits : "The mempool no longer enforces ancestor or descendant size/count limits." - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release announcement, Release page header : "Bitcoin Core 31.0 was published on April 19, 2026." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, Notable code changes, Bitcoin Core : "Bitcoin Core #33629 completes the cluster mempool implementation by partitioning the mempool into clusters" ### Pinning and cluster mempool design - Transaction pinning is when an attacker exploits limits in mempool relay policy to stop an incentive-compatible transaction from being accepted or fee-bumped. BIP 431's TRUC rules (also called version 3 transaction relay) were designed to make pinning harder for contract protocols such as Lightning, where parties sign time-sensitive transactions to broadcast later. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.pinning - T1 BIP 431, Topology Restrictions for Pinning, Motivation : "malicious actors may sometimes exploit limitations to prevent incentive-compatible transactions" - T1 BIP 431, Topology Restrictions for Pinning, Motivation, contracting protocols : "Pinning is consequential to contracting protocols in which untrusted parties construct and sign time-sensitive transactions to be broadcast on-chain later" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Version 3 transaction relay, Topic summary : "Combined with package relay, these policies help enable the use of dynamic feerates with LN onchain transactions." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Version 3 transaction relay, Topic summary : "designed to prevent pinning attacks." - Since Bitcoin Core 31.0, a replacement is accepted only if the mempool's feerate diagram is strictly better afterward, a check performed by the function ImprovesFeerateDiagram, declared in src/policy/rbf.h. The release notes say this eliminates all known cases where replacements left the mempool worse off. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.rbf-feerate-diagram - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, RBF rule changes : "This eliminates all known cases of replacements occurring that make the mempool worse off, which was possible" - T2 Bitcoin Core doc/policy/mempool-replacements.md, Rule 6 : "The feerate diagram of the mempool must be strictly improved by the replacement transaction." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/policy/rbf.h, ImprovesFeerateDiagram, ImprovesFeerateDiagram declaration : "The replacement transaction must improve the feerate diagram of the mempool." - Bitcoin Core 31.0 removed the CPFP carve-out, which had let one extra small child join a package already at its descendant limit. The release notes say contract protocols needing similar behavior are expected to use TRUC transactions and sibling eviction instead. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/fees-and-mempool.cpfp-carveout-removed - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, CPFP carveout : "The CPFP carveout allowed one additional child transaction to be added to a package that's already at its" - T1 Bitcoin Core 31.0 release notes, Mempool, CPFP carveout : "It is expected that smart contracting use-cases requiring similar functionality employ TRUC transactions" ## Segregated Witness (SegWit) https://blocklore.space/topics/segwit 5 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What it is - Segregated Witness (SegWit) is a Bitcoin soft fork, activated in 2017, that moves the signature data of a transaction (its "witness") into a separate structure that blocks commit to apart from the transaction data that the transaction ID covers. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.what-it-is - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Abstract : "that is committed to blocks separately from the transaction merkle tree." - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 release notes, Segregated witness soft fork, Notable changes, Segregated witness soft fork : "(segregate) transaction signatures (witnesses) from the part of the data in a transaction that is covered by the txid." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Segregated witness, Topic description, first sentence : "was a soft fork that activated in 2017." ### Addresses and fees - SegWit's consensus rules have been enforced on the Bitcoin mainnet since block 481,824, mined on 24 August 2017, and Bitcoin Core records that height together with the block's hash in its mainnet parameters. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.activation-height - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, consensus.SegwitHeight : "consensus.SegwitHeight = 481824; // 0000000000000000001c8018d9cb3b742ef25114f27563e3fc4a1902167f9893" - T1 Block 481,824, Block header, timestamp 1503539857 (24 August 2017, 01:57:37 UTC) - Native SegWit version 0 addresses on the Bitcoin mainnet use the Bech32 format defined in BIP 173 and start with "bc1q", for example the BIP's sample P2WPKH address bc1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kv8f3t4; BIP 173 requires encoders to output them in lowercase. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.native-address-prefix - T1 BIP 173, Base32 address format for native v0-16 witness outputs, Examples, Mainnet P2WPKH : "bc1qw508d6qejxtdg4y5r3zarvary0c5xw7kv8f3t4" - T1 BIP 173, Base32 address format for native v0-16 witness outputs, Specification, Bech32, encoding case : "Encoders MUST always output an all lowercase Bech32 string." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Bech32(m), Topic description : "Bech32 and Bech32m are address formats used to pay native segwit outputs." - BIP 173 states that the Bech32 checksum used by native SegWit addresses guarantees detection of any error affecting at most 4 characters; BIP 350 later described a weakness with inserted or deleted characters, which it says does not affect version 0 addresses because they are restricted to two specific lengths. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bech32-error-detection - T1 BIP 173, Base32 address format for native v0-16 witness outputs, Specification, Bech32, checksum : "guarantees detection of any error affecting at most 4 characters" - T1 BIP 350, Bech32m format for v1+ witness addresses, Motivation : "whenever the final character is a 'p', inserting or deleting any number of 'q' characters immediately preceding it does not invalidate the checksum." - T1 BIP 350, Bech32m format for v1+ witness addresses, Motivation : "This does not affect existing uses of witness version 0 BIP173 addresses due to their restriction to two specific lengths," - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Bech32(m), Topic description : "includes an error-correction code that can catch almost all address typos" - BIP 141 defines a transaction's virtual size, measured in vbytes, as its transaction weight divided by 4 and rounded up to the next integer. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.virtual-size - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction size calculations : "/ 4 (rounded up to the next integer)." - For a typical transaction with one input and two outputs, Bitcoin Optech calculated in April 2019 that spending a native SegWit (P2WPKH) output takes 141 vbytes against 220 vbytes for a legacy P2PKH output, about 35% less, so the same fee rate in sat/vB costs less in total. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.spend-size-comparison - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 16 April 2019, Bech32 sending support : "Spending P2WPKH output has a size of 141 vbytes (16% savings vs P2SH-P2WPKH or 35% vs P2PKH)" - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 16 April 2019, Bech32 sending support : "Spending P2PKH has a total transaction size of 220 vbytes" ### Why wallets use it - As of block 976,753, the default for Bitcoin Core's -addresstype wallet option is bech32 (native SegWit); the Bitcoin Core 0.20.0 release notes record the change that made the wallet use bech32 addresses by default when used through RPC and create native SegWit change outputs. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.core-default-bech32 - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.20.0 release notes, Wallet, Notable changes, Wallet : "The wallet now by default uses bech32 addresses when using RPC, and creates native segwit change outputs." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/wallet/wallet.h, DEFAULT_ADDRESS_TYPE, DEFAULT_ADDRESS_TYPE : "inline constexpr OutputType DEFAULT_ADDRESS_TYPE{OutputType::BECH32};" - Under BIP 143, each signature on a SegWit version 0 input commits to the amount of the input it signs, which BIP 143 says lets an offline signing device learn that amount from an untrusted source; Bitcoin Optech reported in June 2020 that this proved insufficient against a fee overpayment attack on multi-input transactions. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.input-value-signed - T1 BIP 143, Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program, Motivation : "a cold wallet may safely sign a transaction by learning the value from an untrusted source." - T1 BIP 143, Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program, Abstract : "and to cover the input value by the signature." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 10 June 2020, News, Fee overpayment attack on multi-input segwit transactions : "Unfortunately, signing a single UTXO’s amount turned out to be insufficient." ### How it works - Under BIP 141 every transaction has two identifiers: the txid, the double SHA-256 of the serialization without witness data (unchanged from before SegWit), and the wtxid, the double SHA-256 of the serialization that includes the witness. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.txid-and-wtxid - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction ID : "remains unchanged: the double SHA256 of the traditional serialization format:" - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Transaction ID : "is defined: the double SHA256 of the new serialization with witness data:" - Since SegWit, a Bitcoin block's size limit is expressed in weight units: weight is the block's size without witness data times 3 plus its full size, and a valid block may weigh at most 4,000,000 weight units (BIP 141). established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.block-weight - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/consensus.h, MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT, MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT : "The maximum allowed weight for a block, see BIP 141 (network rule)" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/validation.h, GetTransactionWeight and GetBlockWeight, Comment above GetTransactionWeight : "weight = (stripped_size * 3) + total_size." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Block size : "≤ 4,000,000." - Under SegWit's weight formula, each byte of non-witness transaction data counts as 4 weight units and each byte of witness data counts as 1; Bitcoin Core names this factor of 4 WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.witness-discount - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/validation.h, GetTransactionWeight, Comment above GetTransactionWeight : "These implement the weight = (stripped_size * 4) + witness_size formula," - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/consensus.h, WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR, WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR : "inline constexpr int WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR = 4;" - Because a SegWit transaction's signatures sit in the witness, which the txid does not cover, changing how the transaction was signed no longer changes its txid; BIP 141 states this prevents involuntary malleability for any type of script as long as all inputs are signed. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.malleability-fix - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Motivation : "changes to how the transaction was signed are no longer relevant to transaction identification." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Motivation : "It prevents involuntary transaction malleability for any type of scripts, as long as all inputs are signed" - BIP 141 presents SegWit's malleability fix as what allows chains of unconfirmed transactions to be built without trusting the counterparty, a building block it names for payment networks such as the Lightning Network. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.enables-lightning - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Motivation : "which enables the building of unconfirmed transaction dependency chains in a trust-free manner." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Motivation : "such as duplex micropayment channel and the Lightning Network, which have the potential to greatly improve" - The Lightning specification (BOLT 3) requires a channel's funding output to be a SegWit pay-to-witness-script-hash (P2WSH) output locking a 2-of-2 multisignature script of the two parties' funding keys. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.lightning-funding-p2wsh - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Funding Transaction Output : "The funding output script is a P2WSH to:" - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Funding Transaction Output : "`2 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG`" - In BIP 141, an output script (or P2SH redeem script) made of a 1-byte push opcode from OP_0 to OP_16 followed by a single direct data push of 2 to 40 bytes has a special meaning: the first push is the version byte and the pushed bytes are the witness program. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.witness-program - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program : "followed by a direct data push between 2 and 40 bytes gets a new special meaning." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program : "The following byte vector pushed is called the "witness program"." - A version 0 witness program with a 20-byte program is a pay-to-witness-public-key-hash (P2WPKH) output and one with a 32-byte program is a pay-to-witness-script-hash (P2WSH) output; Bitcoin Core checks these sizes in VerifyWitnessProgram in src/script/interpreter.cpp. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.v0-program-types - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program, P2WPKH : "It is interpreted as a pay-to-witness-public-key-hash (P2WPKH) program." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program, P2WSH : "It is interpreted as a pay-to-witness-script-hash (P2WSH) program." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram : "} else if (program.size() == WITNESS_V0_KEYHASH_SIZE) {" - BIP 141 reserves witness versions 1 to 16 for future extensions and leaves their programs uninterpreted, so nodes that predate a new version accept its spends; later soft forks can then give a version new rules without breaking older nodes. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.witness-versions-upgrade - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program : "If the version byte is 1 to 16, no further interpretation of the witness program or witness stack happens," - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Witness program : "These versions are reserved for future extensions." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Motivation, script versioning : "programs with unknown versions are always considered as anyone-can-spend script" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, fallthrough for unknown versions : "// Other version/size/p2sh combinations return true for future softfork compatibility" - Taproot (BIP 341) defines rules for SegWit witness version 1: a Taproot output is a native SegWit output with witness version 1 and a 32-byte program, which Bitcoin Core checks in VerifyWitnessProgram. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.taproot-is-v1 - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules : "A Taproot output is a native SegWit output" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, witness version 1 branch : "} else if (witversion == 1 && program.size() == WITNESS_V1_TAPROOT_SIZE && !is_p2sh) {" - BIP 350 keeps the original Bech32 encoding for SegWit version 0 addresses (P2WPKH and P2WSH) and specifies a modified checksum, Bech32m, for addresses of witness version 1 and later, such as Taproot addresses. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bech32m-for-v1 - T1 BIP 350, Bech32m format for v1+ witness addresses, Abstract : "Bech32 remains in use for segregated witness outputs of version 0." - T1 BIP 173, Base32 address format for native v0-16 witness outputs, Disclosures : "BIP-350 proposes using the scheme described in this BIP only for Native Segwit v0 outputs." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Bech32(m), Topic description : "It is expected that bech32m will be used for taproot and future segwit-based script upgrades," ### The specifications - BIP 143 defines a new signature hash for SegWit version 0 inputs that reduces redundant hashing during verification, avoiding legacy signature hashing's quadratic growth, and that commits to the input amount; Bitcoin Core implements it in SignatureHash for SigVersion::WITNESS_V0. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bip143-sighash - T1 BIP 143, Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program, Abstract : "in order to minimize redundant data hashing in verification," - T1 BIP 143, Transaction Signature Verification for Version 0 Witness Program, Motivation : "as the number of sigops in a transaction increases." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, SignatureHash, SignatureHash, witness v0 branch : "if (sigversion == SigVersion::WITNESS_V0) {" - BIP 144 specifies how SegWit data travels between nodes: an extended transaction serialization with a zero marker byte and a nonzero flag byte, new getdata types for requesting witness data, and a service bit with which a node signals it can serve witnesses. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bip144-p2p - T1 BIP 144, Segregated Witness (Peer Services), Abstract : "This BIP defines new messages and serialization formats for propagation of transactions and blocks" - T1 BIP 144, Segregated Witness (Peer Services), Specification, Serialization, marker : "The marker byte is set to zero so that this structure will never parse as a valid transaction" - T1 BIP 144, Segregated Witness (Peer Services), Handshake : "A node will signal that it can provide witnesses using the following service bit" - BIP 145 updates the getblocktemplate JSON-RPC call that mining software uses so that block templates support SegWit, including a block weight limit field and a per-transaction weight field. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bip145-gbt - T1 BIP 145, getblocktemplate Updates for Segregated Witness, Abstract : "This BIP describes modifications to the getblocktemplate JSON-RPC call" - T1 BIP 145, getblocktemplate Updates for Segregated Witness, Block template, transactions, weight : "numeric weight of the transaction, as counted for purposes of the block's weightlimit;" ### In the code - A SegWit block commits to its witness data through a commitment in an output script of its coinbase transaction; Bitcoin Core verifies it in CheckWitnessMalleation in src/validation.cpp and rejects a mismatching block with the reason "bad-witness-merkle-match". established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.witness-commitment - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Specification, Commitment structure : "of the coinbase transaction." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, CheckWitnessMalleation, CheckWitnessMalleation : "static bool CheckWitnessMalleation(const CBlock& block, bool expect_witness_commitment, BlockValidationState& state)" - In Bitcoin Core's VerifyWitnessProgram, when the SCRIPT_VERIFY_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_WITNESS_PROGRAM flag is set, a spend of a witness program with a not-yet-defined version fails with an error instead of succeeding as it does under consensus rules alone. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.unknown-versions-policy - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, unknown witness versions : "return set_error(serror, SCRIPT_ERR_DISCOURAGE_UPGRADABLE_WITNESS_PROGRAM);" - Bitcoin Core PR #16060, merged on 15 August 2019, replaced SegWit's BIP 9 deployment logic with a hardcoded activation height ("burying" the deployment); as of block 976,753, Bitcoin Core's mainnet parameters carry SegwitHeight = 481824 rather than version-bits parameters for SegWit. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.buried-deployment - T1 Bitcoin Core PR, PR description : "This hardcodes CSV and segwit activation heights, similar to the BIP 90 buried deployments for BIPs 34, 65 and 66." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, consensus.SegwitHeight : "consensus.SegwitHeight = 481824; // 0000000000000000001c8018d9cb3b742ef25114f27563e3fc4a1902167f9893" ### Deployment history - The SegWit implementation entered Bitcoin Core's master branch through PR #8149, "Segregated witness rebased", a rebased and squashed version of PR #7910, merged on 24 June 2016 and later shipped with mainnet deployment parameters in Bitcoin Core 0.13.1. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.core-implementation-pr - T1 Bitcoin Core PR, PR description : "This PR is a rebased and squashed version of" - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 release notes, Segregated witness soft fork, Notable changes, Segregated witness soft fork : "Activation for the segwit soft fork is being managed using BIP9 versionbits." - SegWit was deployed with BIP 9 version bits on bit 1, with a mainnet signaling window from 15 November 2016 to 15 November 2017: if 95% of blocks in a 2,016-block retarget period signaled, it would lock in, and activate 2,016 blocks later. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bip9-deployment - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Deployment : "This BIP will be deployed by "version bits" BIP9 with the name "segwit" and using bit 1." - T1 BIP 141, Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Deployment : "For Bitcoin mainnet, the BIP9 starttime will be midnight 15 November 2016 UTC (Epoch timestamp 1479168000)" - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 release notes, Segregated witness soft fork, Notable changes, Segregated witness soft fork, activation : "If 95% of blocks within a 2,016-block retarget period (about two weeks) signal support for segwit," - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 release notes, Segregated witness soft fork, Notable changes, Segregated witness soft fork, activation : "After another 2,016 blocks, segwit will activate." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, History, 2016 to 2017 : "The segwit soft fork was released with BIP9 activation parameters." - According to Bitcoin Optech's account of the 2017 deployment, BIP 91 locked in and activated first, SegWit's own BIP 9 deployment then locked in and activated, and BIP 148's mandatory signaling expired when SegWit locked in. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.bip91-outcome - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, History, 2016 to 2017 : "BIP91 locked in and activated." - T1 BIP 148, Mandatory activation of segwit deployment, Specification : "This BIP will cease to be active when segwit is locked-in." - How much did each 2017 event, including BIP 148 and BIP 91, contribute to SegWit's activation? Bitcoin Optech describes this as remaining "a subject of debate"; the chain records which blocks signaled, but not why their miners chose to signal. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.activation-causes-debated - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, History, 2016 to 2017, closing paragraph : "It remains a subject of debate exactly how much each of the above events, and other events occurring around the" ## Taproot https://blocklore.space/topics/taproot 2 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What it is - Taproot is a soft fork upgrade to Bitcoin, active since November 2021, that adds a new kind of output whose coins can be spent either with a single signature or by revealing one of several spending conditions committed to in advance. established, high confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.what-it-is - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Taproot, Topic summary, second paragraph : "Coins protected by taproot may be spent either by satisfying one of the committed scripts or by simply providing" - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Abstract : "This document proposes a new SegWit version 1 output type, with spending rules based on Taproot, Schnorr signatures, and Merkle branches." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #175, News, Taproot activated : "as expected, the taproot soft fork activated at block height 709,632." - BIP 341, the main Taproot specification, states that its aim is to improve the privacy, efficiency and flexibility of Bitcoin's scripting capabilities. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.why-it-was-added - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Motivation : "This proposal aims to improve privacy, efficiency, and flexibility of Bitcoin's scripting capabilities without adding new" ### Addresses and activation - On Bitcoin mainnet, a Taproot (P2TR) address starts with "bc1p" and is 62 characters long, and it is encoded with bech32m, the address format BIP 350 defines for SegWit version 1 and later outputs. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.bc1p-addresses - T2 learnmeabitcoin.com, P2TR, Address section : "A P2TR address always starts with bc1p and is 62 characters in length." - T1 BIP 350, Bech32m format for v1+ witness addresses, Specification, addresses for segregated witness outputs : "If its witness version is 1 or higher, encode it using Bech32m." - Taproot activated on Bitcoin mainnet at block 709,632, which was mined on 14 November 2021 with a block timestamp of 05:15:27 UTC. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.activation-height - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Deployment : "The deployment did activate at height 709632 on Bitcoin mainnet." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #175, News, Taproot activated : "as expected, the taproot soft fork activated at block height 709,632." - T1 Bitcoin Core v22.0 src/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, DEPLOYMENT_TAPROOT min_activation_height : "consensus.vDeployments[Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_TAPROOT].min_activation_height = 709632;" - T1 Block 709,632, Block 709,632 header, timestamp 1636866927 ### Privacy and efficiency - When a Taproot output is spent with its key path (a signature for the output's public key), the spend does not reveal whether any alternative script conditions existed for that output. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.key-path-hides-scripts - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Design, Taproot : "As long as the key-based spending path is used for spending, it is not revealed whether a script path was permitted as well" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Taproot, Topic summary, second paragraph : "a signature that verifies against the public key (allowing the scripts to be kept private)." - When a Taproot output is spent through one of its committed scripts, only that script is published on chain and the other committed scripts stay hidden, though the spend does show that a script path existed and that the key path was not used. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.script-path-reveals-one - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Security : "Taproot improves the privacy of Bitcoin because instead of revealing all possible conditions for spending an output," - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Security, script path leakage : "A script path spend leaks that there is a script path and that the key path was not applicable" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Taproot, Topic summary, second paragraph : "to allow committing to more than one script, any one of which may be used at spend time." - A Taproot output controlled by several signers through key aggregation, such as MuSig2 (BIP 327), can be spent with one aggregate key and one signature, so on chain it is indistinguishable from a single-signer Taproot output. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.multisig-looks-single - T1 BIP 327, MuSig2 for BIP340-compatible Multi-Signatures, Motivation : "MuSig2 Taproot outputs are indistinguishable for a blockchain observer from regular, single-signer Taproot outputs" - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Design, Schnorr signature validation : "Such multi-party public keys and signatures are indistinguishable from their single-party equivalents." - A Taproot key path spend reveals no script: its witness carries a single Schnorr signature, checked against the 32-byte public key already in the output being spent. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.key-path-witness - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules : "If there is exactly one element left in the witness stack, key path spending is used:" - T1 BIP 340, Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1, Design, encoding choices : "Encoding only the X coordinate, resulting in 32-byte public keys and 64-byte signatures." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, Taproot key path branch : "if (!checker.CheckSchnorrSignature(stack.front(), program, SigVersion::TAPROOT, execdata, serror)) {" ### The specifications - The Taproot soft fork consists of three BIPs deployed together: BIP 340 for Schnorr signatures, BIP 341 for the spending rules of SegWit version 1 outputs, and BIP 342 for Tapscript, the script language used inside Taproot. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.three-bips - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #153, News, Taproot locked in : "the taproot soft fork and related changes specified in BIPs 340, 341, and 342 were locked in by signaling miners" - T1 Bitcoin Core v22.0 src/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, Taproot deployment comment : "// Deployment of Taproot (BIPs 340-342)" - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Abstract : "This document specifies the semantics of the initial scripting system under [[bip-0341.mediawiki|BIP341]]." - BIP 340 specifies the Schnorr signatures Taproot uses: 64-byte signatures over the secp256k1 curve, verified against 32-byte public keys that encode only the X coordinate of the curve point. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.bip340-schnorr - T1 BIP 340, Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1, Abstract : "This document proposes a standard for 64-byte Schnorr signatures over the elliptic curve" - T1 BIP 340, Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1, Design, encoding choices : "Encoding only the X coordinate, resulting in 32-byte public keys and 64-byte signatures." - BIP 340 describes Schnorr signatures as linear, a property that lets several collaborating parties produce one signature that is valid for the sum of their public keys. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.schnorr-linearity - T1 BIP 340, Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1, Motivation, Linearity : "to produce a signature that is valid for the sum of their public keys." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Taproot, Topic summary, second paragraph : "Taproot uses schnorr signatures that simplify multiparty construction (e.g. using MuSig) and MAST" - Taproot (BIP 341) defines rules for SegWit witness version 1: a Taproot output is a native SegWit output with witness version 1 and a 32-byte program, which Bitcoin Core checks in VerifyWitnessProgram. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/segwit.taproot-is-v1 - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules : "A Taproot output is a native SegWit output" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, witness version 1 branch : "} else if (witversion == 1 && program.size() == WITNESS_V1_TAPROOT_SIZE && !is_p2sh) {" - BIP 341 chooses between the two ways of spending a Taproot output by counting witness elements after removing any annex: exactly one element means a key path spend, and two or more mean a script path spend. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.key-or-script-path - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules, key path : "If there is exactly one element left in the witness stack, key path spending is used:" - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules, script path : "If there are at least two witness elements left, script path spending is used:" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyWitnessProgram, VerifyWitnessProgram, Taproot branch, annex detection : "if (stack.size() >= 2 && !stack.back().empty() && stack.back()[0] == ANNEX_TAG) {" - For a Taproot output with a script tree, the output key is an internal public key tweaked with the tree's Merkle root, and Bitcoin Core checks a script path spend in VerifyTaprootCommitment by recomputing that root and verifying the tweak. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.output-key-commitment - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, VerifyTaprootCommitment, VerifyTaprootCommitment : "// Verify that the output pubkey matches the tweaked internal pubkey, after correcting for parity." - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Informal design overview : "of a Merkle tree whose leaves consist of a version number and a script." - Each leaf of a Taproot script tree pairs a script with a leaf version, so later soft forks can introduce new script versions; Tapscript as defined in BIP 342 uses leaf version 0xc0. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.script-tree-leaves - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Design, future extensions : "new script versions can be introduced with a soft fork while remaining compatible with BIP 341." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.h, Taproot constants, TAPROOT_LEAF_TAPSCRIPT : "inline constexpr uint8_t TAPROOT_LEAF_TAPSCRIPT = 0xc0;" - BIP 342 Tapscript disables OP_CHECKMULTISIG and OP_CHECKMULTISIGVERIFY and adds OP_CHECKSIGADD (opcode 0xba), which checks one signature and adds the result to a running count, so threshold scripts check signatures one at a time. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.checksigadd - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, rules for signature opcodes : "The following script opcodes are disabled in tapscript:" - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, OP_CHECKSIGADD : "The opcode 186 (0xba) is named as OP_CHECKSIGADD." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, EvalScript, OP_CHECKSIGADD, EvalScript, case OP_CHECKSIGADD : "stack.push_back((num + (success ? 1 : 0)).getvch());" ### In the code - The BIP 341 signature message for Taproot spends is computed in Bitcoin Core by SignatureHashSchnorr in src/script/interpreter.cpp, which hashes it with the BIP 340 tagged hash "TapSighash". established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.sighash-trace - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, SignatureHashSchnorr, SignatureHashSchnorr : "bool SignatureHashSchnorr(uint256& hash_out, ScriptExecutionData& execdata, const T& tx_to, uint32_t in_pos," - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.cpp, tagged hash writers, HASHER_TAPSIGHASH : "const HashWriter HASHER_TAPSIGHASH{TaggedHash("TapSighash")};" - Bitcoin Core PR #19953, which implemented validation of BIP 340, BIP 341 and BIP 342, was merged on 15 October 2020 without any signing or wallet support. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.merge-pr - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #19953, Implement BIP 340-342 validation (Schnorr/taproot/tapscript), Pull request description; merged 2020-10-15T08:23:21Z : "No signing or wallet support of any kind is included, as testing is done entirely through the Python test framework." ### Tapscript and tree details - In a Taproot script path spend, the last witness element is the control block: 33 bytes plus 32 bytes for each Merkle path node, and Bitcoin Core accepts at most 128 path nodes, which limits a script tree to a depth of 128. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.control-block - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Specification, Script validation rules, script path : "The last stack element is called the control block" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/script/interpreter.h, Taproot constants, TAPROOT_CONTROL_MAX_NODE_COUNT : "inline constexpr size_t TAPROOT_CONTROL_MAX_NODE_COUNT = 128;" - BIP 342 renames opcode numbers 80, 98, 126 to 129, 131 to 134, 137, 138, 141, 142, 149 to 153 and 187 to 254 as OP_SUCCESSx: if a Tapscript contains any of them, validation succeeds without applying the other rules, which BIP 342 describes as a mechanism to upgrade the Script system. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.op-success - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, OP_SUCCESSx : "is encountered, validation succeeds (none of the rules below apply)." - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, OP_SUCCESSx opcode list : "80, 98, 126-129, 131-134, 137-138, 141-142, 149-153, 187-254" - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, OP_SUCCESSx footnote : "is a mechanism to upgrade the Script system." - BIP 342 removes two limits of earlier Bitcoin script for Tapscript: the maximum script size of 10,000 bytes and the limit of 201 non-push opcodes per script. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.tapscript-limits - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, Resource limits, script size limit : "The maximum script size of 10000 bytes does not apply." - T1 BIP 342, Validation of Taproot Scripts, Specification, Resource limits, non-push opcodes limit : "The maximum non-push opcodes limit of 201 per script does not apply." ### Activation history - Taproot was activated with Speedy Trial, a variant of BIP 9 version bits signaling: if 90% of blocks (1,815 of 2,016) in a retarget period signaled on bit 2 between 24 April and 11 August 2021, Taproot would lock in and then activate no earlier than block 709,632. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.speedy-trial - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.21.1 release notes, Taproot soft fork : "Activation for taproot is being managed using a variation of BIP9 versionbits called Speedy Trial (described in BIP341)." - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.21.1 release notes, Taproot soft fork, threshold : "If 90% of blocks within a 2,016-block retarget period (about two weeks) signal support for taproot" - T1 BIP 341, Taproot, Deployment : "For Bitcoin mainnet, the starttime is epoch timestamp 1619222400 (midnight 24 April 2021 UTC), timeout is" - T1 Bitcoin Core v22.0 src/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, DEPLOYMENT_TAPROOT : "consensus.vDeployments[Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_TAPROOT].bit = 2;" - Taproot's Speedy Trial activation parameters were added to Bitcoin Core in PR #21686, merged on 15 April 2021, shortly after PR #21377 added Speedy Trial support to the version bits code the same day. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.speedy-trial-params-pr - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #21686, Speedy trial activation parameters for Taproot, Pull request description; merged 2021-04-15T08:20:34Z : "Adds the activation parameters for taproot as specified in https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/pull/1104" - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #21377, Speedy trial support for versionbits, Pull request description; merged 2021-04-15T02:05:16Z : "BIP9-based implementation of "speedy trial" activation specification" - Taproot locked in during June 2021: Optech Newsletter #153, published on 16 June 2021, reported that signaling miners had locked in the soft fork the previous weekend, about five months before it activated at block 709,632. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.lock-in - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #153, News, Taproot locked in : "the taproot soft fork and related changes specified in BIPs 340, 341, and 342 were locked in by signaling miners" - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter #153, News, Taproot locked in, safety note : "Taproot will be safe to use after block 709,632, which is expected in early or mid November." - Since Bitcoin Core PR #23536, merged on 25 March 2022, Bitcoin Core enforces Taproot's script rules on every block where SegWit rules apply, including blocks before 709,632, regardless of the version bits deployment status, with one exception block. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.buried-deployment - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #23536, Enforce Taproot script flags whenever WITNESS is set, Pull request description; merged 2022-03-25T13:12:03Z : "it makes sense to enforce its rules on all blocks, even historic ones, regardless of the deployment status." - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #23536, Enforce Taproot script flags whenever WITNESS is set, Pull request description, the exception : "I found one block which fails verification with the flags applied, so I added a `TaprootException`" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, script_flag_exceptions : "consensus.script_flag_exceptions.emplace( // Taproot exception" - Bitcoin Core's mainnet parameters exempt block 692,261, mined in July 2021 before Taproot activated, from Taproot script verification, checking it only with the P2SH and SegWit script flags, because that block fails the Taproot rules. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.exception-block - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, script_flag_exceptions, Taproot exception : "uint256{"0000000000000000000f14c35b2d841e986ab5441de8c585d5ffe55ea1e395ad"}, SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS);" - T1 Bitcoin Core PR #23536, Enforce Taproot script flags whenever WITNESS is set, Pull request description, the exception : "I found one block which fails verification with the flags applied, so I added a `TaprootException`" - T1 Block 692,261, Block 692,261 header, timestamp 1627028660 (23 July 2021) - As of Bitcoin Core commit f498a5a6 (November 2026), the mainnet MinBIP9WarningHeight is block 711,648, which the code describes as the Taproot activation height plus one miner confirmation window (709,632 plus 2,016 blocks). established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/taproot.warning-height - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, MinBIP9WarningHeight : "consensus.MinBIP9WarningHeight = 711648; // taproot activation height + miner confirmation window" ## Lightning Network https://blocklore.space/topics/lightning ### What it is - The Lightning Network is a protocol for fast bitcoin payments over a network of payment channels between pairs of nodes. Payments move off-chain, and Bitcoin transactions are used to open channels and to enforce their balances when the parties do not cooperate. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.what-it-is - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Introduction, the opening paragraph : "Lightning is a protocol for making fast payments with Bitcoin using a network of channels." - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Opening summary of the BOLT documents : "relying on on-chain transactions for enforcement if necessary" - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 7, Payment Channels, Funding a channel, initial state example : "This means that Alice can send payments to Bob across the channel, but Bob has no funds to send to Alice yet." - A Lightning payment channel is shared between two peers, who move funds between their sides of the channel off-chain by exchanging signatures on an updated transaction, without broadcasting each update to the Bitcoin network. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.channel - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Glossary, Glossary and Terminology Guide, Channel : "To transact funds, peers exchange signatures to create an updated" - A Lightning payment can travel through intermediate nodes using conditional payments locked to a hash. Each hop is paid when the final recipient releases the matching secret, called the payment preimage, which also serves the sender as proof of payment. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.multi-hop-payment - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Glossary, Glossary and Terminology Guide, Payment preimage : "The final recipient releases the preimage in order to" - T1 BOLT 11, Invoice Protocol for Lightning Payments, Tagged Fields, p (payment hash) : "Preimage of this provides proof of payment." ### Paying and receiving - A Lightning recipient can request a payment with an invoice in the BOLT 11 format, a QR-code-ready payment request. On Bitcoin mainnet a BOLT 11 invoice starts with the prefix "lnbc". established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.bolt11-invoice - T1 BOLT 11, Invoice Protocol for Lightning Payments, Introduction : "A simple, extendable, QR-code-ready protocol for requesting payments over Lightning." - T1 BOLT 11, Invoice Protocol for Lightning Payments, Human-Readable Part, prefix : "e.g. `lnbc` for Bitcoin mainnet" - A BOLT 11 Lightning invoice expires: its optional expiry field gives a time in seconds, and when the field is absent the specification sets the expiry to 3,600 seconds (1 hour). established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.invoice-expiry - T1 BOLT 11, Invoice Protocol for Lightning Payments, Tagged Fields, x (expiry) : "Default is 3600 (1 hour) if not specified." - Each Lightning node that forwards a payment can charge a routing fee, set per channel as a fixed base fee in millisatoshis plus a proportional fee in millionths of the amount forwarded, as specified in BOLT 7. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.routing-fees - T1 BOLT 7, P2P Node and Channel Discovery, HTLC Fees, HTLC Fees : "fee_base_msat + ( amount_to_forward * fee_proportional_millionths / 1000000 )" - A Lightning payment attempt can fail because the sender cannot see how funds are split inside other people's channels. When a channel on the chosen route lacks enough funds on the forwarding side for the amount, that attempt fails. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.payment-failure - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 12, Path Finding and Delivery, Liquidity uncertainty : "However, channel liquidity is unknown to the sender." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 12, Path Finding and Delivery, Learning from errors, temporary channel failure : "the most likely reason is a lack of liquidity for the specific amount." - To receive over Lightning, a node needs inbound liquidity: funds on the peer's side of its channels. A channel the node opens and funds by itself typically starts with the balance on the node's own side, so the node can send through that channel before it can receive. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.inbound-liquidity - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Getting Inbound Liquidity : "Now the balance is on the other end of the channel, which means that you can receive payments." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 7, Payment Channels, Funding a channel, initial state example : "The channel has been set up, but in its initial state, all the capacity (140,000 satoshis) is on Alice's side." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Getting Inbound Liquidity : "Inbound liquidity does not happen automatically, so you have to find ways to build it for your node." - A Lightning payment can be split into several parts sent over different routes and combined by the recipient. BOLT 9 signals this with the basic_mpp feature (bits 16/17), meaning a node can receive basic multi-part payments. established, high confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.multipart-payments - T1 BOLT 9, Assigned Feature Flags, Feature table, basic_mpp : "Node can receive basic multi-part payments" - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 12, Path Finding and Delivery, Multipart payments, splitting strategies : "Some current implementations use a very simple strategy of splitting the payment in two halves, four quarters, etc." ### Custody, backups and watching the chain - In a custodial Lightning wallet, a third party controls custody of the funds and the user relies on that party. In a self-custodial (noncustodial) Lightning wallet, the keys are stored locally under the user's control. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.custodial-wallets - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 2, Getting Started, Lightning wallets, custodial wallets : "This is a custodial wallet where someone else controls custody of the funds." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 2, Getting Started, Lightning wallets, noncustodial wallets : "The term noncustodial wallet just implies that the keystore is local and under the user's control." - The book Mastering the Lightning Network describes custodial Lightning wallets as the least technically demanding option, and describes control over keys as a principal consideration when choosing a Lightning wallet. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.custody-tradeoff - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 2, Getting Started, Lightning wallets, custodial wallets : "This is the least technically challenging option, but" - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 2, Getting Started, Lightning wallets, choosing a wallet : "Therefore, the issue of control over keys is a principal consideration when choosing a Lightning wallet." - In LND, the wallet seed alone recovers only on-chain funds. Recovering funds held in open channels also needs a Static Channel Backup (SCB), which lets the node reconnect to its peers and use the protocol's Data Loss Protection feature so the peers close those channels. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.channel-backups - T2 LND docs/recovery.md, Recovering Funds From lnd, on-chain recovery : "If one is only attempting to recover _on chain_ funds, then only the first item" - T2 LND docs/recovery.md, Off-Chain Recovery, Static Channel Backups : "need to initiate the Data Loss Protection (DLP) feature in the protocol, which" - T2 LND docs/recovery.md, Off-Chain Recovery, restoring from an SCB : "The remote peer will discover that we've lost data, and then immediately force close their channel." - Restoring a Lightning node from a copy of its channel database is risky, because the copy may not hold the latest channel state. Broadcasting an old, revoked commitment transaction lets the channel peer claim all of that commitment's outputs with a penalty transaction. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.old-state-danger - T2 LND docs/recovery.md, Off-Chain Recovery, why not copy channel.db : "knows if they have the latest state of a channel or not." - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Commitment Transaction Outputs, to_local output : "It can be claimed, without delay, by the other party if they know the revocation private key." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Backups : "Second, restoring from a channel backup is dangerous." - A self-custodial Lightning node must have the Bitcoin blockchain watched, by itself or through a watchtower, for transactions that spend its channels, so it can respond with a penalty transaction if a peer broadcasts an old channel state. A node that is offline during such an attempt, with no watchtower, can lose funds. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.watch-the-chain - T1 BOLT 5, Recommendations for On-chain Transaction Handling, General Nomenclature, requirements : "MUST monitor the blockchain for transactions that spend any output that is NOT" - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 7, Payment Channels, Cheating with old commitment transactions : "In practice, both Alice and Bob have to monitor for cheating." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Watchtowers : "But if your node is down during the protocol violation, you might lose money." - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Watchtowers : "To solve this problem, we can use one or more watchtowers to outsource the job of monitoring protocol violations and issuing penalty transactions." - A Lightning watchtower is a service that monitors the Bitcoin blockchain on a user's behalf and broadcasts a penalty transaction if a channel peer publishes an outdated channel state, so the user can go offline for significant amounts of time. established, high confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.watchtowers - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Watchtowers, Topic summary : "monitor the block chain for transactions that may cause one of their users to lose funds" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Watchtowers, Topic summary : "go offline for significant amounts of time" - T2 Mastering the Lightning Network, chapter 5, Operating a Lightning Network Node, Watchtowers : "are a mechanism for outsourcing the monitoring and penalty resolution of Lightning protocol violations." ### Specification and implementations - The Lightning protocol is specified in the BOLT documents of the lightning/bolts repository, a set of numbered files including BOLT 2 (peer protocol), BOLT 3 (transactions), BOLT 4 (onion routing), BOLT 7 (gossip), BOLT 11 (invoices) and BOLT 12 (offers), as of 20 November 2026. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.bolts-specification - T1 lightning/bolts README.md, Introduction : "The specifications are currently a work-in-progress and currently being drafted." - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Introduction : "Lightning is a protocol for making fast payments with Bitcoin using a network of channels." - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index (table of contents), Table of Contents : "[BOLT #12](12-offer-encoding.md): Negotiation Protocol for Lightning Payments" - T1 BOLT 12, Negotiation Protocol for Lightning Payments, Encoding : "The human-readable prefix for offers is `lno`." - T1 BOLT 4, Onion Routing Protocol, Overview : "The routing schema is based on the [Sphinx][sphinx] construction and is" - A Lightning channel opens with an on-chain funding transaction whose channel output, in BOLT 3, pays to a 2-of-2 multisignature script built from the two peers' funding public keys, ordered lexicographically, so it can only be spent with both peers' signatures. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.funding-output - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Transactions, Funding Transaction Output : "2 2 OP_CHECKMULTISIG" - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Transactions, Funding Transaction Output : "is the lexicographically lesser of the two `funding_pubkey` in compressed format" - T1 BOLT 2, Peer Protocol for Channel Management, Channel Establishment v1, the open_channel Message : "This is the first step toward creating the funding transaction and both versions of the commitment transaction." - Each Lightning channel update creates new commitment transactions and revokes the old ones: a peer revokes an old commitment by revealing its revocation secret, after which the other peer can claim that commitment's delayed output immediately if it is ever broadcast. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.commitment-revocation - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Glossary, Glossary and Terminology Guide, Commitment revocation private key : "revealing this key is how old commitment" - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Commitment Transaction Outputs, to_local output : "It can be claimed, without delay, by the other party if they know the revocation private key." - In BOLT 3, the outputs of a Lightning commitment transaction that return funds to the peer who broadcast it are delayed by to_self_delay blocks, a value the other peer sets in BOLT 2, giving that other peer time to spot a revoked commitment and claim the funds. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.to-self-delay - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Commitment Transaction Outputs, to_local output : "must be delayed for `to_self_delay` blocks" - T1 BOLT 2, Peer Protocol for Channel Management, The open_channel Message, field descriptions : "`to_self_delay` is the number of blocks that the other node's to-self" - A Hashed Time Locked Contract (HTLC) is a conditional Lightning payment between two peers, carried as an output of the commitment transaction: the recipient claims it with a signature and the payment preimage, or else the payer reclaims it after a set time. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.htlc - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Glossary, Glossary and Terminology Guide, HTLC : "the payment by presenting its signature and a" - T1 BOLT 0, Introduction and Index, Glossary, Glossary and Terminology Guide, HTLC : "otherwise the payer can cancel the contract by spending it after" - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Offered HTLC Outputs, witness script : "OP_DUP OP_HASH160 OP_EQUAL" - Lightning payments are routed with onion encryption based on the Sphinx construction, specified in BOLT 4. The onion packet's hop payloads are a fixed 1,300 bytes, and an intermediate node cannot learn which other nodes, besides its predecessor and successor, are on the route. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.onion-routing - T1 BOLT 4, Onion Routing Protocol, Overview : "The routing schema is based on the [Sphinx][sphinx] construction and is" - T1 BOLT 4, Onion Routing Protocol, Overview, privacy properties : "They cannot learn which other nodes, besides their predecessor or successor, are part of the packet's route" - T1 BOLT 4, Onion Routing Protocol, Packet Structure, hop_payloads : "It is 1300 bytes long and has the following structure:" - Lightning nodes learn about public channels and other nodes through gossip messages specified in BOLT 7, which defines three gossip messages for channel and node discovery, including a channel announcement that proves a channel exists between two nodes. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.gossip - T1 BOLT 7, P2P Node and Channel Discovery, Overview : "To support channel and node discovery, three" - T1 BOLT 7, P2P Node and Channel Discovery, Definition of short_channel_id and channel_announcement rationale : "Proving the existence of a channel between `node_1` and `node_2` requires:" - In BOLT 3's anchor commitment format (feature option_anchors, bits 22/23 in BOLT 9), each anchor output on a Lightning commitment transaction is fixed at 330 sats, which BOLT 3 gives as the default dust limit for P2WSH outputs. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.anchor-outputs - T1 BOLT 3, Bitcoin Transaction and Script Formats, Commitment Transaction Outputs, to_local_anchor and to_remote_anchor : "The amount of the output is fixed at 330 sats, the default dust limit for P2WSH." - T1 BOLT 9, Assigned Feature Flags, Feature table, option_anchors (bits 22/23) : "Anchor commitment type with zero fee HTLC transactions" - BOLT 12 offers are longer-lived Lightning payment requests, encoded with the prefix "lno", from which a payer requests a fresh invoice over the Lightning Network itself. BOLT 12 uses blinded paths in place of BOLT 11's payment_secret and payment_metadata. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.offers - T1 BOLT 12, Negotiation Protocol for Lightning Payments, Offers : "Offers are a precursor to an invoice_request: readers will request an invoice" - T1 BOLT 12, Negotiation Protocol for Lightning Payments, Encoding : "The human-readable prefix for offers is `lno`." - T1 BOLT 12, Negotiation Protocol for Lightning Payments, Rationale, blinded paths : "Blinded paths provide an equivalent to `payment_secret` and `payment_metadata` used in BOLT 11." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Offers, Topic summary : "Offers is a protocol for Lightning that allows nodes to request and receive invoices over LN." - LND (the Lightning Network Daemon), Core Lightning (previously c-lightning), Eclair (written in Scala) and LDK (the rust-lightning project) are implementations of the Lightning protocol, each developed in its own repository as of 20 November 2026. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.implementations - T1 LND README.md, Opening description : "The Lightning Network Daemon (`lnd`) - is a complete implementation of a" - T1 Core Lightning README.md, Opening description : "Core Lightning (previously c-lightning) is a lightweight, highly customizable and" - T1 Eclair README.md, Opening description : "is a Scala implementation of the Lightning Network." - T1 LDK rust-lightning README.md, Opening description : "is a highly performant and flexible implementation of the Lightning Network protocol." ### Open problems and recent spec work - Channel jamming is a denial-of-service attack on Lightning in which an attacker sends payments that it delays settling, tying up the funds or the pending-payment slots of channels along a route of up to 20 hops so honest payments cannot use them. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.channel-jamming - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Topic summary : "Denial of Service (DoS) attacks where an attacker can prevent a series of channels up to 20 hops away" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Topic summary, liquidity jamming : "sends it to themselves across 20 other channels" - BOLT 2 lets a Lightning node accept at most 483 pending payments (HTLCs) from its channel peer, or 114 on zero_fee_commitments channels. Optech's channel jamming topic describes how the 483 limit enables HTLC jamming: an attacker sends 483 small payments and leaves them unsettled, filling the slots while locking little value. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.htlc-slot-limit - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Topic summary, HTLC jamming : "HTLC jamming attack is where an attacker sends 483 small payments" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Topic summary, HTLC jamming : "where 483 is the maximum number of pending payments a channel may contain" - T1 BOLT 2, Peer Protocol for Channel Management, The open_channel Message, receiver requirements (channel types other than zero_fee_commitments) : "`max_accepted_htlcs` is greater than 483." - T1 BOLT 2, Peer Protocol for Channel Management, The open_channel Message, receiver requirements (channel_type includes zero_fee_commitments) : "`max_accepted_htlcs` is greater than 114." - Which defense against Lightning channel jamming, if any, will the BOLTs specify? As of 20 November 2026 this is unresolved. Optech records proposals from 2019 to 2026, including upfront fees and local reputation, and reported LND's experimental reputation scoring in October 2026. A merged BOLTs change would settle it. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.jamming-open-problem - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Optech newsletter mentions, 2026 (links to the newsletter of 23 October 2026) : "LND #10919 adds experimental local reputation scoring based on HTLC accountability" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Optech newsletter mentions, 2019 : "Hashcash and refund-based upfront fees to mitigate jamming" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Channel jamming attacks, Optech newsletter mentions, 2025 : "Protocol proposed for upfront and hold fees to address channel jamming" - The offers protocol was added to the Lightning specification as BOLT 12 when BOLTs pull request #798 was merged on 24 September 2024, as reported in Optech's newsletter of 4 October 2024. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.bolt12-merged - T1 lightning/bolts PR #798: Offers, Pull request description; merged 2024-09-24T10:40:59Z : "Offers are "static invoices", with many more features." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 4 October 2024, Notable code and documentation changes, BOLTs : "merges the offers protocol specification which introduces BOLT12" - Splicing, specified in BOLT 2, replaces a Lightning channel's funding transaction with a new one, which lets the peers add funds to or remove funds from an open channel without closing it. BOLT 9 assigns it the option_splice feature bits 62/63. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.splicing - T1 BOLT 2, Peer Protocol for Channel Management, Channel Splicing, Channel Splicing : "Splicing is the term given for replacing the funding transaction with a new one." - T1 BOLT 9, Assigned Feature Flags, Feature table, option_splice : "Allows replacing the funding transaction with a new one" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Splicing, Topic summary : "Splicing is the act of transferring funds from onchain outputs into a payment channel" - The splicing protocol was merged into the Lightning specification on 23 March 2026 through BOLTs pull request #1160, "Channel Splicing (feature 62/63)", which replaced the earlier draft in BOLTs pull request #863. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.splicing-merged - T1 lightning/bolts PR #1160: Channel Splicing (feature 62/63), Pull request description; merged 2026-03-23T08:27:48Z : "Splicing takes place while a channel is quiescent, to ensure that both peers have the same view of the current commitments." - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, 27 March 2026, Notable code and documentation changes, BOLTs : "BOLTs #1160 merges the splicing protocol into the Lightning specification, replacing the draft in BOLTs #863" - As of 20 November 2026, BOLT 9 in the lightning/bolts repository assigns feature bits 40/41 to zero_fee_commitments, a Lightning channel type whose commitment and HTLC transactions pay zero fees, and points to BOLT 3's shared anchor output for it. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.zero-fee-commitments - T1 BOLT 9, Assigned Feature Flags, Feature table, zero_fee_commitments (bits 40/41) : "Zero-fee commitment and HTLC transactions" - As of 20 November 2026, the lightning/bolts repository holds an extension document, "Simple Taproot Channels", created 20 April 2022, in which the channel's multisignature funding output becomes a single P2TR key formed with MuSig2 key aggregation. It is outside the numbered BOLTs. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/lightning.simple-taproot-channels - T1 Extension BOLT XX: Simple Taproot Channels, Introduction, Abstract : "The multisig output becomes a single P2TR key" - T1 Extension BOLT XX: Simple Taproot Channels, Document header : "Extension BOLT XX: Simple Taproot Channels" ## The BIP process https://blocklore.space/topics/bip-process 1 more claims on this topic wait for human review and are not shown. ### What a BIP is - A Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) is an improvement proposal for Bitcoin. BIP 3, the process document, says most BIPs give a concise, self-contained technical description of one new concept, feature or standard. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.what-a-bip-is - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is a BIP? : "Most BIPs provide a concise, self-contained, technical description of one new concept, feature, or standard." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is a BIP? : "BIPs are improvement proposals for Bitcoin." - BIP 3 states that BIPs do not define what Bitcoin is, that individual BIPs do not represent Bitcoin community consensus, and that a BIP is a personal recommendation by its authors to the Bitcoin community. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.not-consensus - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Significance of BIPs? : "BIPs do not define what Bitcoin is: individual BIPs do not represent Bitcoin community consensus" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Significance of BIPs? : "A BIP represents a personal recommendation by the BIP authors to the Bitcoin community." - According to BIP 3, the document that sets out the BIP process, no formal or informal decision body governs Bitcoin development or decides whether BIPs are adopted. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.no-decision-body - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Purpose of the BIPs Repository? : "No formal or informal decision body governs Bitcoin development or decides adoption of BIPs." - Anyone may submit a BIP: BIP 3, the document that sets out the BIP process, states that BIPs may be submitted by anyone, provided the content is of high quality. established, medium confidence, curious depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.anyone-may-submit - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is a BIP? : "BIPs may be submitted by anyone, provided the content is of high quality" ### A number is not adoption - A BIP number does not mean Bitcoin adopted a proposal. The bitcoin/bips README says publishing a BIP there shows it is in scope and met formal criteria, but not that it is a good idea, has community consensus or is about to be adopted. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.number-not-adoption - T2 bitcoin/bips README, Introduction, before the BIP table : "but does not indicate that it is a good idea, has community consensus, or that it is about to be adopted" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Significance of BIPs? : "BIPs do not define what Bitcoin is: individual BIPs do not represent Bitcoin community consensus" - BIP 3 notes that some BIPs may never be adopted, some may be adopted by one or more Bitcoin clients or related software, and some may end up changing the consensus rules the Bitcoin ecosystem jointly enforces. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.some-never-adopted - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Significance of BIPs? : "Some BIPs may never be adopted." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Fundamentals, What is the Significance of BIPs? : "Some may even end up changing the consensus rules that the Bitcoin ecosystem jointly enforces." - The bitcoin/bips repository README states that acceptance and adoption of a BIP ultimately rest with Bitcoin users, and BIP 3 says that once a BIP is Complete it is up to the Bitcoin community to evaluate, adopt, ignore or reject it. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.users-decide - T2 bitcoin/bips README, Introduction, before the BIP table : "ultimately acceptance and adoption rests with the Bitcoin users" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Adoption of Proposals : "After a BIP is advanced to Complete, it is up to the Bitcoin community to evaluate, adopt, ignore, or reject a BIP." - Under BIP 3, the bitcoin/bips repository does not track sentiment about proposals or their adoption beyond whether a BIP is in active use. BIP 3 encourages individual Bitcoin projects to publish lists of the BIPs they implement. established, medium confidence, user depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.repository-does-not-track-adoption - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Adoption of Proposals : "The BIPs repository does not track the sentiment on proposals and does not track the adoption of BIPs beyond whether they are in active use or not." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Adoption of Proposals : "Individual Bitcoin projects are encouraged to publish a list of BIPs they implement." ### What your software implements - Whether a wallet or node follows a given BIP depends on that software, not on the BIP. Bitcoin Core, for example, keeps a list of the BIPs it implements in doc/bips.md, and as of its master branch on 20 November 2026 that list includes BIP 32 but not BIP 39, the mnemonic seed phrase standard. established, medium confidence, holder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.check-your-software - T1 Bitcoin Core doc/bips.md, First line and list of implemented BIPs : "BIPs that are implemented by Bitcoin Core:" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Adoption of Proposals : "Individual Bitcoin projects are encouraged to publish a list of BIPs they implement." ### The process documents - As of block 976,761 (20 November 2026), BIP 3, "Updated BIP Process", is the process document in force for the bitcoin/bips repository. Its preamble gives Status Deployed and Type Process, and the text says it replaces BIP 2 as the guideline for the BIP process. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.bip3-in-force - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Backward Compatibility : "This BIP replaces BIP 2 as the guideline for the BIP process." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Preamble : "Status: Deployed" - As of block 976,761 (20 November 2026), BIP 2, "BIP process, revised", has Status Closed, and its preamble names BIP 3 as its replacement. BIP 2 had itself replaced BIP 1, the original BIP process document. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.bip2-closed - T1 BIP 2: BIP process, revised, Preamble : "Proposed-Replacement: 3" - T1 BIP 2: BIP process, revised, Preamble : "Replaces: 1" - BIP 3 asks authors to present a first sketch of a proposal to the Bitcoin Development Mailing List and to avoid opening a pull request in the bitcoin/bips repository with a BIP draft out of the blue. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.mailing-list-first - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Ideation : "As a first sketch of the proposal is taking shape, the authors should present it to the" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Ideation : "Authors should avoid opening a pull request with a BIP draft out of the blue." - T2 bitcoin/bips README, Introduction, before the BIP table : "People wishing to submit a BIP should first describe their idea to the" - Authors do not choose their own BIP numbers. Under BIP 3, only BIP Editors may assign a number, and a number counts as assigned only after a BIP Editor has announced it publicly in the proposal's pull request to the bitcoin/bips repository. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.numbers-assigned-by-editors - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Draft : "Only BIP Editors may assign BIP numbers." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Draft : "A number may be considered assigned only after it has been publicly announced in the pull request by a BIP Editor." - T2 bitcoin/bips README, Introduction, before the BIP table : "After a proposal meets the editorial criteria, a BIP Editor will assign a number to it" - BIP Editors, as BIP 3 describes them, check editorial criteria for a new BIP, such as prior discussion on the Bitcoin Development Mailing List and correct Layer and Type headers, then assign a number and merge. BIP 3 states that editors do not evaluate whether a proposal is likely to be adopted. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.editors-role - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Editors, BIP Editor Responsibilities and Workflow : "Editors do NOT evaluate whether the proposal is likely to be adopted." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Editors, BIP Editor Responsibilities and Workflow : "The idea has been previously proposed to the Bitcoin Development Mailing List and discussed there" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Editors, BIP Editor Responsibilities and Workflow : "The defined Layer and Type headers must be correctly assigned for the given specification" - T2 bitcoin/bips README, Introduction, before the BIP table : "The BIP Editors are expected to be liberal with publishing BIPs" ### Statuses, types and layers - BIP 3 cut the number of BIP status values from nine under BIP 2 to four: Draft, Complete, Deployed and Closed. A BIP in Complete status can only move to Deployed or Closed. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.four-statuses - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Backward Compatibility, Changes from BIP 2 : "Status field values are reduced from nine to four:" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Complete : "A Complete BIP can only move to Deployed or Closed." - Under BIP 3, any community member may request that a Complete BIP advance to Deployed by showing evidence that the BIP is in active use, and a Deployed BIP is considered final. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.deployed-status - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Deployed : "Then, a BIP may be advanced to Deployed upon request by any community member with evidence" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Deployed : "Once Deployed, the BIP is considered final." - In BIP 3, the Closed status marks BIPs that are only of historical significance. Closed BIPs are not deleted, and if a Draft BIP appears stalled for a year, anyone may propose that its status be changed to Closed. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.closed-status - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Closed (footnote) : "The Closed Status provides value to the audience by indicating which documents are only of historical significance." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Draft : "appears stalled for a year, anyone may propose the BIP status be updated to Closed." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Closed : "BIPs do not get deleted, they are retained even after being updated to Closed." - BIP 3 defines three BIP types: a Specification BIP sets technical rules for a new feature or for interoperability between implementations, an Informational BIP describes a design issue or gives guidelines or information, and a Process BIP describes or changes a process surrounding Bitcoin. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.three-types - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Format and Structure, BIP Types : "defines a set of technical rules describing a new feature or affecting the interoperability of implementations" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Format and Structure, BIP Types : "describes a process surrounding Bitcoin, or proposes a change to (or an event in) a process." - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Format and Structure, BIP Types : "describes a Bitcoin design issue, or provides general guidelines or other information to the Bitcoin community." - BIP 3 supersedes BIP 2's Standards Track type, used for changes affecting most or all Bitcoin implementations, with the similar Specification type. On BIP 3's activation, Standards Track BIPs and eligible Informational BIPs are assigned the Specification type. established, medium confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.standards-track-renamed - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Backward Compatibility, Changes from BIP 2 : "The Standards Track type is superseded by the similar Specification type." - T1 BIP 2: BIP process, revised, BIP types : "A Standards Track BIP describes any change that affects most or all Bitcoin implementations" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Backward Compatibility, Updates to Existing BIPs should this BIP be Activated, BIP Types : "Standards Track BIPs and eligible Informational BIPs are assigned the Specification type." - A BIP's Layer header, when present, names the part of Bitcoin the BIP applies to, using the classification in BIP 123: the Consensus layer, the Peer Services layer, the API/RPC layer and the Applications layer. established, high confidence, builder depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.layers - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, BIP Header Preamble, Header Descriptions, Layer : "The layer of Bitcoin the BIP applies to using the BIP classification defined in" - T1 BIP 123: BIP Classification, Classification system, Peer Services Layer : "The peer services layer specifies how nodes find each other and propagate messages." - T1 BIP 123: BIP Classification, Classification system, API/RPC Layer : "The API/RPC layer specifies higher level calls accessible to applications." ### How the process changed - Process BIPs follow a different rule for becoming Deployed: under BIP 3, a Process BIP moves from Complete to Deployed when it reaches rough consensus on the Bitcoin Development Mailing List, after its advancement has been open to discussion there for at least one month. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.process-bip-rough-consensus - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Deployed, Process BIPs : "A Process BIP may change status from Complete to Deployed when it achieves rough consensus" - T1 BIP 3: Updated BIP Process, Workflow, Progression through BIP Statuses, Deployed, Process BIPs : "A proposal is said to have rough consensus if its advancement has been open to discussion on the mailing list" - Optech Newsletter #382 (28 November 2025) reported a motion on the Bitcoin-Dev mailing list to activate BIP 3 in place of BIP 2. bitcoin/bips pull request #1820, "Process: Activate BIP3", which applies the changes BIP 3 prescribes on activation, was merged on 14 January 2026. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.bip3-activated - T1 bitcoin/bips PR #1820: Process: Activate BIP3, PR description; merged 14 January 2026 : "This is a first draft of applying the changes prescribed by BIP 3 in the section" - T2 Bitcoin Optech Newsletter, News, Motion to activate BIP3 : "After that date, BIP3 will replace BIP2 as the BIP process." ### Activation happens outside the process - BIP 9 specifies version bits: miners signal readiness for a soft fork by setting a bit in the block version, support is tallied each 2,016-block retarget period, and on mainnet a deployment locks in when at least 1,916 blocks (95%) of a period signal before its timeout. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.bip9-mechanism - T1 BIP 9: Version bits with timeout and delay, Specification, Parameters and State transitions : "The threshold is ≥1916 blocks (95% of 2016), or ≥1512 for testnet (75% of 2016)." - T1 BIP 9: Version bits with timeout and delay, Specification, Parameters : "The timeout specifies a time at which the deployment is considered failed." - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/params.h, struct BIP9Deployment, struct BIP9Deployment, threshold : "uint32_t threshold{1916};" - BIP 8 is an alternative to BIP 9 version bits that uses block heights instead of timestamps for start and timeout, and adds a lockinontimeout flag that, when set, requires blocks to signal in the final period so the soft fork locks in by the timeout height. established, medium confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.bip8-mechanism - T1 BIP 8: Version bits with lock-in by height, Abstract : "Block heights are used for start and timeout rather than POSIX timestamps." - T1 BIP 8: Version bits with lock-in by height, Specification, Parameters : "blocks are required to signal in the final period, ensuring the soft fork has locked in by timeoutheight." - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, Topic summary, BIP8 : "BIP8’s flexibility allowed it to be used to compare a variety of activation proposals" - The soft fork combining BIP 68, BIP 112 and BIP 113 (often called CSV) was the first deployed with BIP 9 version bits: Bitcoin Core 0.12.1 signaled it on bit 0 from 1 May 2016, and its rules have been active on mainnet since block 419,328. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.csv-activation - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.12.1 release notes, Notable changes, first version bits BIP9 softfork deployment : "setting bit 0 to indicate support for this combined" - T2 BIP 9 deployment assignments (bips repository), Deployments table, csv row : "active since #419328" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, consensus.CSVHeight : "consensus.CSVHeight = 419328;" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, Topic summary, BIP9 : "This activation method was first used with the soft fork that added BIP68 consensus-enforced sequence numbers," - Segregated witness (BIP 141) was deployed with BIP 9 version bits on bit 1, released in Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 with a signaling start of 15 November 2016, and its rules have been active on mainnet since block 481,824. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.segwit-activation - T1 BIP 141: Segregated Witness (Consensus layer), Deployment : "For Bitcoin mainnet, the BIP9 starttime will be midnight 15 November 2016 UTC (Epoch timestamp 1479168000)" - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.13.1 release notes, Notable changes, Segregated witness soft fork : "Segwit's version bit is bit 1, and nodes will begin" - T2 BIP 9 deployment assignments (bips repository), Deployments table, segwit row : "active since #481824" - T2 Bitcoin Optech topic, Soft fork activation, Topic summary, BIP9 : "The segwit soft fork was released with BIP9 activation parameters." - The Taproot soft fork activated on mainnet at block 709,632 through Speedy Trial, a variation of BIP 9 version bits released in Bitcoin Core 0.21.1, with a lock-in threshold of 1,815 of 2,016 blocks (90%) and a minimum activation height of block 709,632. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.taproot-activation - T1 Bitcoin Core 0.21.1 release notes, Taproot soft fork : "Activation for taproot is being managed using a variation of BIP9 versionbits called Speedy Trial (described in BIP341)." - T1 BIP 341: Taproot: SegWit version 1 spending rules, Deployment : "the threshold is 1815 blocks (90%) instead of 1916 blocks (95%)" - T1 BIP 341: Taproot: SegWit version 1 spending rules, Deployment : "the min_activation_height is block 709632" - T1 BIP 341: Taproot: SegWit version 1 spending rules, Deployment : "The deployment did activate at height 709632 on Bitcoin mainnet." - After a soft fork has activated, Bitcoin Core can replace its version bits deployment with a hardcoded activation height, called a buried deployment (BIP 90). As of Bitcoin Core master on 20 November 2026, CSV is buried at block 419,328 and segwit at block 481,824. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.buried-deployments - T1 Bitcoin Core src/consensus/params.h, enum BuriedDeployment, Comment above enum BuriedDeployment : "A buried deployment is one where the height of the activation has been hardcoded into" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/kernel/chainparams.cpp, CMainParams, CMainParams, consensus.SegwitHeight : "consensus.SegwitHeight = 481824;" - As of Bitcoin Core master on 20 November 2026, GetBlockScriptFlags in src/validation.cpp turns on the P2SH, segwit and Taproot script rules for every block except two listed exceptions, because only one historical mainnet block violated the Taproot rules and one violated P2SH. established, high confidence, researcher depth. https://blocklore.space/claims/bip-process.taproot-always-enforced - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockScriptFlags, GetBlockScriptFlags : "ConsensusScriptVerifyFlags flags{SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_TAPROOT};" - T1 Bitcoin Core src/validation.cpp, GetBlockScriptFlags, GetBlockScriptFlags, comment : "Similarly, only one historical block violated the TAPROOT rules on"